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The History of Wrongful Execution
BRUCE P. SMITH*
In recent years, concern that innocent persons' have been convicted,
and, more troublingly, executed has spurred extensive commentary by
scholars,2 practitioners,3 activists, 4 legislators, 5 j , 6 aschlas, p cttiner,'acivits' i a r,'judges , nd members of
* Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar; Co-Director, Illinois Legal History Program;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Earlier versions of this paper were
presented at annual meetings of the American Society for Legal History and the Pacific Coast
Conference on British Studies, and at a faculty workshop at the Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. I am grateful to Margareth Etienne, Patrick Keenan, Norman Lefstein, David
Lieberman, Richard McAdams, Beth Robischon, Barbara Shapiro, and those who attended earlier
presentations of this paper for their reactions. I am also grateful to Janis Johnston, Director of the
Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Memorial Law Library at the University of Illinois College of Law, for her
assistance with obtaining access to rare legal-historical sources, and to the Bodleian Library at the
University of Oxford for permitting me to consult their collection of seventeenth-century broadsides
concerning wrongful executions.
1. As used in this Article, the terms "innocent" or "actually innocent" describe persons who did
not commit either the crime(s) for which they were convicted or any related crime(s). The term
"wrongfully convicted" describes persons convicted in proceedings in which prejudicial legal error
occurred and, as such, includes persons who were not actually innocent of the crimes for which they
were convicted. The term "wrongful execution" refers to the execution of innocent persons. For
elaboration of these definitional distinctions, see Cathleen Burnett, Constructions of Innocence, 70
UMKC L. REV. 971 (2002); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346 n.92 (1997); Daniel S. Medwed, Actual
Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1097 (2003).
2. See, e.g., JIM DWYER, ET. AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); DAVID PROTESS & Roa WARDEN, A PROMISE OF
JUSTICE: THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR FIGHT TO SAVE FOUR INNOCENT MEN (1998); Alan W. Clarke et al.,
Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall Hypotheses, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
309 (2000); Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. I (2002); Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are
Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 00 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000); Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the
Death Penalty, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States 1989 Through 2003 (Apr. 19, 2004), at www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/exonerations-in-us.pdf.
3. A.B.A. House of Delegates, Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project (Feb. 3,
1997) , available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/resolution.html (calling for a moratorium on the
death penalty until jurisdictions can adequately address the risk that wrongful executions may occur).
+ See, e.g., RICHARD DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: THE INCREASING DANGER OF EXECUTING THE INNOCENT (July 1997), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=292 (identifying twenty-one persons
sentenced to death as of 1997 "for whom there is now convincing evidence of their innocence");
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the press! This concern has contributed to a series of high-profile legal
developments: a state-wide moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois;8
the establishment in several states of commissions dedicated to the
prevention of wrongful conviction and execution;9 the establishment of
"innocence projects" at numerous American law schools designed to
identify and litigate cases of wrongful conviction or actual innocence;'"
and, in 2002, a short-lived decision by a federal district judge holding that
the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) violated the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution because the administration of capital
punishment under federal law risked the wrongful execution of innocent
persons.
To activists opposed to the death penalty, the prospect that persons
might be executed for crimes that they did not commit provides what is
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Fact Sheet: Innocence, at http://www.ncadp.org/
fact sheet4.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) (identifying eight cases between 1992 and 2005 of alleged
"mistaken execution").
5. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Changes in Death Penalty Laws Around the
U.S., 2000-2005, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpdid=236&scid=40 (last visited Apr. 2o,
2005) (surveying legislative reforms).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D. Mass. 2003) ("[In the past
decade substantial evidence has emerged to demonstrate that innocent individuals are sentenced to
death, and undoubtedly executed, much more often than previously understood."); Michael A.
Ponsor, Life, Death, and Uncertainty, 14 FED. SENT. REP. 6o (July/Aug. 2ooi) ("[A] legal regime
relying on the death penalty will inevitably execute innocent people-not too often, one hopes, but
undoubtedly sometimes.").
7. See, e.g., Death Penalty Caught in Growing Cross Fire: Reportedly Error-Prone System
Contends with Multiple Attacks, CNN.coM (June 12, 2000), at http://archives.cnn.com/2ooo/LAW/
o6/i i/death.penalty/.
8. Former Governor George Ryan instituted a moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois in
January 2ooo. For background on the decision, see Report of the Commission on Capital Punishment
(2002) [hereinafter Illinois Commission Report], For scholarly reactions to Ryan's decision, see
Margareth Etienne, Tinkering with Death in Illinois, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1073 (2003); Austin Sarat &
Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of
Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004). On the moratorium movement in America generally, see
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the
United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. I (2002).
9. See Jon B. Gould, After Further Review: A New Wave of Innocence Commissions, 88
JUDICATURE 126 (2004).
to. In 1992, Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck founded the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law to handle cases "where DNA testing of evidence can yield conclusive proof of
innocence." Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/faq.php. Since that time,
institutions devoted to identifying cases of wrongful conviction have been established at numerous
American law schools, including Brooklyn Law School, Duke University School of Law, Hamline
University School of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, the University of North Carolina
School of Law, the Thomas M. Cooley School of Law, the University of Washington School of Law,
and the University of Wisconsin School of Law. See generally Jan Stiglicz et al., The Hurricane Meets
the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects' New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 413 (2002),
I I. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declaring Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 to be unconstitutional), rev'd, 313 F.3 d 49 (2d Cir. 2002), reh'g denied, 317 F.3 d 86
(2d Cir. 2003).
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probably the most compelling argument in favor of abolishing capital
punishment.'2 In early 2005, for example, America's most prominent and
impassioned critic of capital punishment-Sister Helen Prejean-
published an account of two alleged "wrongful executions" as part of her
campaign to secure a nationwide moratorium on the death penalty in
America.'3 Even President George Bush, a long-time supporter of the
death penalty, who had previously asserted that none of the 152
executions that occurred in Texas during his governorship had been
wrongful, has implicitly acknowledged the potential for fatal error in
capital cases. In his State of the Union Address in February 2005, the
President urged that criminal defendants not "pay the price" for crimes
that they had not committed-a brief statement to be sure, but one
hailed by critics of the death penalty as an important acknowledgment of
the risks of irreversible mistakes in the administration of capital cases. 4
Although the problem of wrongful execution has generated
considerable public commentary, it remains, as yet, unclear whether
contemporary anxiety concerning "the death of innocents" will catalyze
significant change in the administration of the death penalty in
America. 5 On the one hand, some prominent defenders of capital
punishment have expressed doubts that verifiable cases of wrongful
execution in the modern era can really be identified.'6 On the other hand,
procedural bars, the posthumous destruction of biological evidence, and
the competing demands on those engaged in representing persons on
death row make it difficult for lawyers, journalists, and activists to
12. As U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell has observed, "[p]erhaps the most successful rhetorical
attack on the death penalty has been the claim that innocent persons have been convicted of, and even
executed for, capital offenses." Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE
DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 183, 205 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul
G. Cassell eds., 2004) [hereinafter Cassell, Defense].
13. HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWTNESS ACCOUNT OF WRONGFUL
EXECUTIONS (2005). For further information on Sister Helen's efforts, see www.prejean.org,
www.moratoriumcampaign.org, and www.deathofinnocents.com.
14. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/o2/2005o2o2-Ii.html ("In America we must make
doubly sure no person is held to account for a crime he or she did not commit-so we are dramatically
expanding the use of DNA evidence to prevent wrongful conviction."). For reactions to the
President's comments, see Peter Baker, Behind Bush's Bid to Save the Innocent. State of the Union
Remarks Were the Culmination of Complicated Maneuvering, WASH. POST., Feb. 4, 2005, at A9 ("As
governor of Texas, George W. Bush presided over 152 executions, more than any governor in any
state in modem U.S. history. He commuted just one capital sentence and harbored no doubts in the
system. 'I'm confident we have not put to death anyone who has been innocent,' he once said."),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62273-2oo5Feb3.html; and National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Statement of President Barry Scheck On President Bush's
State of the Union Address (Feb. 3, 2005), at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/newsreleases/2005mnoo4
(asserting that the President's decision to "raise[] these issues in his State of the Union speech speaks
volumes as to the size of the problem of wrongful convictions and wrongful executions").
15. See supra note 13.
i6. See infra Part III.A.
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identify clear cases of wrongful execution. 7 Also, when actual cases of
alleged wrongful execution are identified and chronicled, their narrators
invariably encounter competing "counter-narratives" in the opinions of
the state and federal appellate courts that affirmed the underlying
convictions and, not infrequently, in the statements of interested victims'
rights organizations and prosecutors. 18 Moreover, in recent years, federal
and state courts have overwhelmingly rejected arguments advanced by
lawyers engaged in capital defense that the risk that persons will be
wrongfully executed renders capital punishment an unconstitutional
violation of due process. 9 Finally, some supporters of the death penalty
continue to view fatal error as the inevitable cost of any human endeavor
and, indeed, one that is tolerable based on the death penalty's alleged
value in deterring crime and, thus, in protecting other innocent persons
from death."0
Despite the prominence of wrongful execution in contemporary
debates about the death penalty, scholars continue to know very little
about the phenomenon's history. This Article represents the first attempt
to reconstruct that history. In seeking to chart the phenomenon's broad
legal-historical contours, I do not seek to take sides in the acrid and, in
many instances, irresolvable debates about the guilt or innocence of
particular historical figures. Nor is it my goal to attempt to tally the
number of persons who have (or may have) been wrongfully executed in
the past-a task that itself has generated considerable heated debate.
Rather, my aim is to examine how the distinctive problem of wrongful
execution has been perceived and addressed over time by Anglo-
American legal commentators, jurists, lawyers, academics, and activists.
By assessing what the problem of wrongful execution meant to these
individuals, I hope to suggest some of the ways that the specter of
wrongful execution has influenced the administration of criminal justice
over time-and how it might continue to do so today.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the history of
wrongful execution in England from roughly 1640 to 179o. As we shall
see, certain notorious instances of wrongful execution -including, most
glaringly, several executions of innocent persons for crimes that had
never even occurred-generated widespread anxiety among Anglo-
American legal commentators from the seventeenth through the early
nineteenth centuries. During this period, influential treatise writers and
public officials such as Matthew Hale, William Blackstone, and Samuel
March Phillipps urged that courts adopt stricter evidentiary safeguards in
17. See infra Part III.B.
i8. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.D.
2o. See infra Part III.E.
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capital cases, including rigorous application of the corpus delicti doctrine
(the requirement that the prosecution prove, as a threshold matter, that a
crime had actually been committed), as well as other protections
concerning the treatment of circumstantial evidence.
Part II shifts the focus to America and demonstrates the ways that
American criminal justice administrators responded to the problem of
wrongful execution from roughly 1790 to i9oo. Confronted with the
English experience of wrongful execution, American criminal justice
administrators in the nineteenth century sought to preserve the
legitimacy of the death penalty by denying the existence of a "wrongful
execution problem" and by selectively instituting certain safeguards
designed to prevent wrongful executions from occurring.
Building upon the legal-historical discussion in Parts I and II, Part
III examines the issue of wrongful execution in modern-day America and
the challenges of identifying, litigating, and publicizing cases of wrongful
execution despite the "DNA revolution" of the i98os. In recent decades,
several factors-ranging from the posthumous destruction of biological
evidence, to the difficulties of narrating compelling instances of wrongful
execution, to the tolerance for error evinced by certain supporters of the
death penalty-have created challenges for those who seek to rely on the
phenomenon of wrongful execution as a means by which to secure either
abolition of the death penalty or profound change in its administration.
This Article concludes by suggesting that, despite important
differences in the meaning of wrongful execution across historical eras,
the history of wrongful execution remains relevant to modem times. For
example, viewed in the light of history, recent evidentiary proposals
designed to reduce the risk of wrongful executions no longer appear
novel, but instead reflect a return to evidentiary concerns prominent at
the time of America's founding.
I. THE SPECTER OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION IN ENGLAND, 1640-1790
[T]he conviction of a man for an imaginary offense is a scandal to the
administration of justice, and an injury to society, infinitely greater
than an erroneous conviction for an offense really committed. t
By some accounts, legal observers only discovered the problem of
wrongful execution in the past two decades, when the increased
availability and accuracy of DNA testing brought the problem of
wrongful conviction-and the even more shocking prospect of wrongful
execution-to public attention.22 In truth, wrongful execution cast a
21. 2 W.M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; WITH ELEMENTARY RULES FOR
CONDUCTING THE EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 785 (6th ed. 1875).
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 62 (20o3) ("Historically,
we operated our capital punishment systems in this nation as if there were no real likelihood that we
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specter over Anglo-American criminal justice administration from the
seventeenth through the early nineteenth centuries. During this period,
English and American legal commentators confronted the sobering
possibility not only that persons might be executed wrongfully, but that
they undeniably had been-at times for committing offenses that had
never occurred at all.
A. "THE CAMPDEN WONDER" AND THE PROBLEM OF THE MISSING BODY
On August I6, 166o, William Harrison, the steward of Lady
Campden, left his home in Gloucestershire, England, for a nearby town
to collect some rents.23 By eight or nine o'clock that night, the seventy-
year-old Harrison still had not returned from his rounds. Harrison's wife
sent her servant, a fourteen-year-old boy named John Perry, to look for
her husband-but to no avail. The following morning, Harrison's son
Edward took up the search. After meeting up with the servant boy John,
Edward discovered his father's hat and collar near a road in a "hackt,"
"cut," and "bloody" state. Although the townspeople of Campden
"haste[ne]d... in multitudes to search for... [Harrison's] body," they
managed to turn up nothing. 4
would execute an innocent person.").
23. In early modem England, stewards were typically responsible for various domestic duties,
including supervising servants, maintaining accounts, soliciting charitable contributions, dispensing
patronage, and collecting rents. See generally D.R. HA1NSWORTH, STEWARDS, LORDS, AND PEOPLE: THE
ESTATE STEWARD AND His WORLD IN LATER STUART ENGLAND (1992).
24. My account of Harrison's disappearance is largely drawn from the following source: A TRUE
AND PERFECT ACCOUNT OF THE EXAMINATION, CONFESSION, TRIAL, CONDEMNATION, AND EXECUTION OF
JOAN PERRY, AND HER Two SONS, JOHN AND RICHARD PERRY, FOR THE SUPPOSED MURDER OF WILLIAM
HARRISON, GENT. (London, 1676), reprinted in 14 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, CO.S. 1312-24 (London, 1816)
[hereinafter TRUE AND PERFECT ACCOUNT].
The rendition of events in the State Trials series reprints the account of a seventeenth-century
chronicler, Thomas Overbury. See THOMAS OVERBURY, A TRUE AND PERFECT ACCOUNT OF THE
EXAMINATION, CONFESSION, TRIAL, CONDEMNATION AND EXECUTION OF JOAN PERRY, AND HER TWO SONS,
JOHN AND RICHARD PERRY, FOR THE SUPPOSED MURDER OF WILL. HARRISON, GENT BEING ONE OF THE
MOST REMARKABLE OCCURRENCES WHICH HATH HAPPENED IN THE MEMORY OF MAN. SENT IN A LETTER (BY SIR
THOMAS OVERBURY, OF BURTON, IN THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, KNT. AND ONE OF His MAJESTY'S
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE) TO THOMAS SHIRLY, DOCTOR OF PHYSICK, IN LONDON. ALSO MR. HARRISON'S OWN
ACCOUNT HOW HE WAS CONVEYED TO TURK[E]Y, AND THERE MADE A SLAVE ABOVE 2 YEARS, WHEN HIS
MASTER (WHO BOUGHT HIM THERE) DYING, HE RETURN'D TO ENGLAND; IN THE MEAN WHILE, SUPPOSED TO BE
MURDERED BY HIS MAN-SERVANT, WHO FALSLY ACCUSED HIS OWN MOTHER AND BROTHER AS GUILTY OF THE
SAME, AND WERE ALL THREE EXECUTED FOR IT ON BROADWAY-HILLS, IN GLOUCESTERSHIRE (LONDON
1676).
See also THE CAMPDEN WONDER (Sir George Clark ed., 1959); S.M. PHILLIPPS, FAMOUS CASES OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE THEORY OF PRESUMPTIVE PROOF 50-52 (1875)
[hereinafter PHILLIPPS, FAMOUS CASES]. What has come to be known as "the Campden Wonder" has
also been the subject of several plays and other fictional treatments. A website devoted to the subject
(www.campdenwonder.plus.com) provides useful links to many of the relevant seventeenth-century
sources.
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Suspicion soon fell upon John, who was brought before a justice of
the peace (JP) the following day. 5 The boy claimed that, on the night of
Harrison's disappearance, he had begun his search in earnest but had
been "afraid to go forwards" because of the "dark" and, instead, had
returned to rest in his master's "hen-roost." At around midnight, John
had ventured forth once again but had "lost his way" in a "great mist"
and "so lay the rest of the night under a hedge." When he awoke the next
day, he went to a neighboring town, spoke to some people there, and
later met up with Edward. Four other persons who appeared before the
JP corroborated John's story. Nonetheless, the JP committed John to
custody."
Once confined, the young boy began to talk. He claimed to some of
his interlocutors that a "tinker" had killed Harrison, to others that "a
gentleman's servant ... had robbed and murdered him," and to "others
again ... that [Harrison] was murdered, and hid in a bean-rick." As these
stories proliferated, John was once again brought before the JP, a week
after his initial commitment. This time, he told a more chilling story. He
now claimed that his mother, Joan, and brother, Richard, had lain in wait
for Harrison on the night of Harrison's disappearance, strangled him,
and robbed him of his money bags. John also claimed to have heard his
mother and brother discuss throwing Harrison's body "into the great
sink"-a bog near a local mill. Additional searches, however, failed to
turn up Harrison's body.27
When the JP interrogated Joan and Richard, both denied any
wrongdoing. But at the next meeting of the Gloucestershire assizes in
September i66o, a pair of indictments were brought against the three
Perrys: the first, for breaking into Harrison's house the previous year, a
crime in which John-in his apparent mania to confess-had also
implicated the whole family; and the second, for robbing and murdering
Harrison on the night of his disappearance. The Perrys pleaded guilty to
the first charge, begged for a pardon, and received it. The presiding judge
refused to send the second charge to the jury because the body of
Harrison still had not been found.
Unfortunately, the Perrys' troubles did not end-for John continued
25. Under statutes dating from the 155Os, JPs were required to take the examinations of
complainants, suspects, and material witnesses for the prosecution. On the pre-trial committal process
in early modern England, see generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE:
ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE (1974).
26. TRUE AND PERFECT ACCOUNT, supra note 24, at col. 1315.
27. "Upon this confession and accusation, the justice of the [peace] gave order.., for searching
the sink where Mr. Harrison's body was said to be thrown, which was accordingly done, but nothing of
him could be there found: the fish-pools likewise (in Campden) were drawn and searched, but nothing
could be there found neither; so that some were of opinion, the body might be hid in the ruins of
Campden-house, burnt in the late wars, and not unfit for such a concealment; where was likewise
search made, but all in vain." TRUE AND PERFECT ACCOUNT, supra note 24, at col. 1317.
June 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to talk. Not only did he persist in swearing that his mother and brother
had killed Harrison, but he now claimed that the two had "attempted to
poison him in ... jail, so that he durst neither eat nor drink with them."
At the Gloucestershire assizes in Spring 1661, a second indictment for
murder was brought against the three Perrys. Suddenly John-
apparently coming to his senses-insisted that, at the time of his previous
confessions, he was "mad, and knew not what he said." Joan and Robert,
for their part, desperately continued to protest their innocence. Although
Harrison's body still had not been found-in "the great sink" or
anywhere else-a new assize judge, Sir Robert Hyde, permitted the case
to go to a jury. The jury duly pronounced all three members of the family
guilty and Joan, Richard, and John Perry were promptly hanged and
gibbeted on Broadway Hill near Campden.5
So ended the lives of the three Perrys. But two years after their
executions, a "wondrous" event occurred: William Harrison returned to
Gloucestershire, claiming to have been attacked on the night of his
disappearance by an unknown man on horseback, pressed to serve on a
sailing ship, sold into slavery in Turkey, and ultimately spirited back to
England by way of Lisbon. 9
B. ENGLISH RESPONSES TO WRONGFUL EXECUTION
How did English observers respond to the return of Harrison and
the executions of the unfortunate Perrys for a murder that they had not
committed and, indeed, that had not been committed at all? Not
surprisingly, some interpreted the events as signs of Satan's evil designs
and of God's overwhelming mercy. For example, the author of a
pamphlet published in 1662 entitled The Power of Witchcraft claimed
that the elder Harrison had been "bewitched away" by the "Widow
Perry," who had used "wicked Conjuration" to knock him down and
throw him into a pit. After coming to his senses, Harrison had gamely
struggled out of the hole but was "in a moment conveyed to the Sea
side"-how, we are not told-and "from thence in a very short time...
to a rock ... on the coast of Turk[e]y," where he was ultimately taken in
by a Turkish ship and sold into slavery. 30 Likewise, a ballad circulated
28. Gibbeting involved hanging the bodies of executed persons in iron cages measured to fit
them, typically after coating the condemned with pitch or a mixture of tallow and fat. The cage was
usually suspended from a wooden gibbet, located in a prominent and visible place. For an account of
an early eighteenth-century gibbeting, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 158 (2003) (describing the reactions of the
Frenchman C6sar de Saussure to an English gibbeting).
29. On the abduction of English citizens during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
their ensuing captivity in Islamic states, see LINDA COLLEY, CAPnVES (2oo2).
30. THE POWER OF WITCHCRAFT BEING A MOST STRANGE BUT TRUE RELATION OF THE MOST
MIRACULOUS AND WONDERFUL DELIVERANCE OF ONE MR. WILLIAM HARRISON, OF CAMBDEN, IN THE
COUNTY OF GLOCESTER, STEWARD TO THE LADY NOWEL .... (London, 1662), Bodleian Library,
[Vol. 56: 1 85
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shortly after Harrison's return-adorned with pictures of gibbet-hanging
Perrys and an England-bound ship under full sail-portrayed Joan as
"[a] wicked wretch who brought strange things to pass" and Harrison as
a visible sign of God's great "mercy" and "power."3'
Seventeenth-century legal commentators viewed the events with a
more jaundiced eye. Truth be told, the wrongful convictions of the Perrys
were not the first such cases-nor the last-to trouble such writers. As
early as 1644, Sir Edward Coke had discussed in his influential Institutes
of the Laws of England a case arising in Warwickshire in i6ii in which
an uncle had been executed for allegedly murdering his niece, who had
gone missing. Committed by a JP upon suspicion of murder and later
warned to produce the child, the uncle furnished another girl "very like
his own niece" and "appareled... like the true child" in an effort to
prove that his "true" niece was, in fact, still alive. Unfortunately, the ruse
was detected and the uncle was convicted and executed-only to have
the "true" niece return at some later time, stating that she had been
beaten, had run away, and had now returned to claim her inheritance.32
To prominent Restoration-era legal writers like John Hawles and
Matthew Hale, the fate of the Perrys, Coke's "Warwickshire uncle," and
other individuals deemed to have been wrongfully executed provided
cause for sober reflection concerning the acceptable evidentiary
foundations for capital convictions.33 In particular, such incidents
prompted leading English legal commentators to issue strong cautions
about the dangers and limitations of so-called "presumptive" (i.e.,
circumstantial) evidence and to insist that prosecutors be required to
prove that a crime had indeed been committed before permitting a jury
to decide on a capital defendant's fate.34 In I688, for example, Hawles
University of Oxford [hereinafter Bodleian Lib.], shelfmark Douce W 35.
31. TRUTH BROUGHT TO LIGHT: OR, WONDERFUL STRANGE AND TRUE NEWS FROM GLOUCESTER
SHIRE, CONCERNING ONE MR. WILLIAM HARRISON, FORMERLY STEWAR[D] TO THE LADY NOWELL OF
CAMBDEN, WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO BE MURTHERED BY THE WIDOW PERRY AND TWO OF HER SONS, ONE OF
WHICH WAS SERVANT TO THE SAID GENTLEMAN (London, 1662), Bodleian Lib., shelfmark Wood 401 (fol.
191). This broadside is bound with other publications collected and assembled by the antiquarian
Anthony Wood, some of which chronicle other "marvelous" events of the age. See, e.g., Abraham
Miles, A WONDER OF WONDERS; BEING A TRUE RELATION OF THE STRANGE AND INVISIBLE
BEATING OF A DRUM... (London 1662), Bodleian Lib., shelfmark Wood 401 (fols. 193-94)
(capitalization in original). For a discussion of the treatment of such "wondrous" events in early
modem English broadside literature, see DAVID CRESSY, TRAVESTIES AND TRANSGRESSIONS IN TUDOR
AND STUART ENGLAND (2000).
32. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING
HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINALL CAUSES 232 (London, i644); see also
2 MATrHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACrrORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 299 (P.R.
Glazebrook gen. ed., Professional Books, 1971) (1736).
33. Hawles (1645-1716) served as Solicitor General (1695-1702) and a Member of Parliament
(1695-I7io). Hale (i6o9-i676) served as Lord Chief Justice of England (i67o-I676). For biographical
details, see BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984).
34. For incisive treatments of the status of circumstantial evidence in early modern English
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alluded to "some instances of many" in which wrongful convictions had
been secured, recalling "in [his] time where persons were convicted of
the murder of a person absent, but not dead, barely by inferences upon
the evidence of foolish words and actions" - a reference, quite like!y, to
the case of the three Perrys. Alluding, as well, to the i6ii case from
Warwickshire, Hawles urged that English juries should convict only
"upon direct and manifest proof, not upon probable conjectural
presumptions, or inferences, or strains of wit." To Hawles, these
notorious instances of wrongful execution demonstrated clearly that "it
[was] a most dangerous and unwarrantable thing for a jury, in capital
matters .... to convict a person upon the evidence of probabilities."35
Like Hawles, Hale also expressed considerable reservations about
the use of circumstantial evidence in capital cases. In his highly
influential Pleas of the Crown, written in the 167OS though published
roughly a half-century later, Hale warned that "[he] would never convict
any person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be
done, or at least the body found dead." In support of his rule, Hale
pointed to the case from Warwickshire originally cited by Coke, as well
as another case from Staffordshire in which a man had been convicted of
killing and burning a "victim," who later returned to the scene
unscathed. 6  Deeply troubled by these events, Hale urged that
prosecutors in cases of murder and manslaughter be required to prove
that a wrongful homicide had indeed occurred. For good measure, Hale
extended his caution to the offense of larceny as well, warning that "[he]
would never convict any person for stealing the goods cujusdam ignoti
[i.e., of an unknown person] merely because [the defendant] would not
give an account of how he came by them, unless there were due proof
made, that a felony was committed of these goods."37
The most influential treatise on eighteenth-century English law,
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, echoed
Hale's precepts. In his Commentaries, Blackstone specifically praised the
"two rules" identified by Hale as "most prudent and necessary to be
criminal law, see BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE":
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 200-16, 229-41 (1991)
[hereinafter SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT"]; BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT:
ENGLAND, 1550-1720, at 21-22 (2000).
35. Hawles, ironically, is best known for his pro-jury tracts written several years earlier in the
wake of the seditious libel controversies of the previous decade. On Hawles's role in such matters, see
THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 12OO-18oo, at 252--6o (1985).
36. 2 HALE, supra note 32, at 299. With respect to the case that Hale believed to have arisen in
Staffordshire, he supplied only the initials "A" and "B." For additional discussion of the cases to which
Hale alluded, see JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 417 (3d ed. 194o).
37. 2 HALE, supra note 32, at 290.
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observed":
i. Never to convict a man for stealing the goods of a person unknown,
merely because he will give no account of how he came by them, unless
an actual felony be proved of such goods: and, 2. Never to convict any
person of murder or manslaughter, till at least the body be found dead;
on account of two instances [Hale] mentions, where persons were
executed for the murder of others, who were then alive, but missing.3
Notably, it was at this important juncture of the Commentaries that
Blackstone expressed the maxim that has managed to survive in
contemporary legal discourse only in part: "[A]ll presumptive evidence
of felony should be admitted cautiously: for the law holds, that it is better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."39
How can we summarize the views of these prominent English legal
commentators concerning the problem of wrongful execution? First,
both Hale and Blackstone articulated what would come, over time, to be
known as the corpus delicti rule-the rule, applicable in modern Anglo-
American jurisdictions, that the prosecution must carry the burden of
proving that a crime has actually been committed before a jury may
decide on a defendant's guilt or innocence.4" The rule, to be sure, is likely
to strike twenty-first-century readers as a curious vestige; not
surprisingly, perhaps, few legal scholars have devoted sustained attention
to the doctrine's historical origins.' When discussed at all, the rule is
associated with the significant, but relatively narrow, risk of false
confession: in the words of one recent decision, "the English corpus
delicti rule... served the limited function of ensuring that a defendant
could not be convicted of a crime to which he had confessed if that crime
never occurred."
In truth, Hale, Blackstone, and subsequent Anglo-American treatise
writers who echoed their views intended that the corpus delicti doctrine
should apply more broadly. Rather than limiting their concerns to the
prospect of false confessions, they urged that prosecutors be required to
prove the actual commission of a felony in all instances in which
prosecutors in capital cases sought to rely upon certain unreliable forms
of circumstantial evidence. Their insistence that prosecutors be required
38. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 359 (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 2002) (1769).
39. Id. at 358-59. For further discussion of Blackstone's pronouncement in the context of shifting
notions of the presumption of innocence, see Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the
English Law of Theft, 1750-1850 , 23 LAW & HiST. REV. 133, 145 (20o5) [hereinafter Smith, Presumption
of Guilt].
40. "This requirement is widely if not universally recognized in modem law and is quite
frequently embodied in statutes." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 365 (Edward Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
41. But see David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 817 (2003);
Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638 (955).
42. United States v. Bryce, 2o8 F.3d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
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to establish the commission of an underlying felony derived not so much
from a concern with false confessions per se, but with a more general
suspicion of circumstantial evidence-the brand of evidence considered
especially likely to generate wrongful convictions and, in a system that
relied overwhelmingly on the death penalty for the punishment of
convicted felons, wrongful executions.
In practice, magistrates and judges in England do not appear to have
demonstrated the degree of evidentiary scruple insisted upon by Hawles,
Hale, and Blackstone. In cases of suspected theft, as I have argued
elsewhere, English magistrates frequently convicted criminal suspects in
circumstances where the corpus delicti had not been strictly proven and,
indeed, where no victim had come forward to complain at all.43 Even in
certain cases of clandestine crimes in which defendants' lives were at
stake, English judges urged juries to rely upon circumstantial proof. For
instance, Barbara Shapiro has observed that some judges in the
eighteenth century actually instructed juries about the reliability of
circumstantial evidence. 4 During the trial of the alleged poisoner Mary
Blandy in 1752, the trial judge charged the jury that "[a] slight or
probable presumption only has little or no weight, but a violent
presumption amounts in law to full proof, that is, where circumstances
speak so strongly that to suppose the contrary would be absurd."'45 In the
case of Blandy, who was accused of poisoning her father by mixing
arsenic with the tea and "water gruel" that she had prepared for him, the
trial judge actually instructed the jury that the presumptions that arose
from circumstantial evidence "are more convincing and satisfactory than
any other kind of evidence, because facts cannot lie.""
Similar praise for the reliability of circumstantial evidence was
offered by the judge who presided at the trial of John Donnellan in
I78I." Donnellan had been indicted for allegedly poisoning his brother-
in-law, one Theodosius Boughton, who stood in the way of Donnellan's
succession to the family's landed estate. After Boughton supposedly had
43. See Smith, Presumption of Guilt, supra note 39 (discussing convictions of persons suspected of
theft who failed to "account" satisfactorily for goods found in their possession); Bruce P. Smith, Did
the Presumption of Innocence Exist in Summary Proceedings?, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 191 (2005); Bruce
P. Smith, The Origins of Public Prosecution in England, 1790-185o, i8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
(forthcoming 2006).
44. See SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT," supra note 34, at 217-I8.
45. TRIAL OF MARY BLANDY 132 (William Roughhead ed., 1914); see also Susan Sage Heinzelman,
Guilty in Law, Implausible in Fiction: Jurisprudential and Literary Narratives in the Case of Mary
Blandy, Parricide 1752, in REPRESENTING WOMEN: LAW, LITERATURE AND FEMINISM 309-36 (Susan Sage
Heinzelman & Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman eds., 1994); SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,"
supra note 34, at 217.
46. TRIAL OF MARY BLANDY, supra note 45, at 132 (emphasis added).
47. For details, see JOHN DONNELLAN, A DEFENCE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE TRIAL OF JOHN
DONNELLAN, ESQ; WHO WAS CONVICTED FOR THE MURDER OF SIR THEODOSIUS BOUGHTON, BART. AT THE
ASsIzES HELD AT WARWICK, ON FRIDAY THE 30TH OF MARCH 1781,... (London, 178).
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consumed the contents of a vial purchased from the local apothecary, he
had convulsed, foamed at the mouth, and died. At trial, four medical
experts claimed that Boughton had died from poisoning, basing their
opinions on the circumstances of his death and the testimony of
Boughton's wife that she had smelled an "almond" scent, which the
prosecution's experts believed to be consistent with the smell of laurel
water."' Charging the jury at the Warwick Assizes, Mr. Justice Buller
observed that
the presumption which necessarily arise[s] from circumstances is very
often more convincing, and more satisfactory, than any other kind of
evidence, because it is not in the reach and compass of human abilities,
to invent a train of circumstances which shall so be connected together
as to amount to a proof of guilt, without affording opportunities for
contradicting a great part, if not all, of these circumstances.49
After being instructed in this manner, the jury convicted Donnellan, who
was executed shortly thereafter.
Reflecting on the particular challenges of proving clandestine
crimes, certain English treatise writers agreed that resort to
circumstantial evidence in such cases not only might be necessary but
might, on balance, prove even more reliable than eyewitness testimony.
In 1803, Edward Hyde East observed in his Treatise of the Pleas of the
Crown that, in cases of clandestine crime, "strong circumstantial
evidence.., is the most satisfactory of any from whence to draw the
conclusion of guilt." Noting that persons claiming to be eyewitnesses
could be "seduced to perjury by many base motives," East opined that it
would be rare for "many circumstances,. .. over which the accuser could
have no control" to convincingly form the "links of a transaction" that
"wrongly fix[ed] the presumption of guilt on an individual.""°
Although certain English judges and legal commentators defended
circumstantial evidence as an acceptable basis upon which to ground
convictions in capital cases, others-prompted by additional instances of
wrongful convictions and executions during the eighteenth century-
instituted measures designed to improve evidentiary reliability and to
avoid miscarriages of justice. Such reforms did not focus so much on the
48. Laurel water is distilled from cherry laurel, an evergreen shrub, and contains prussic acid-a
potent, rapidly acting poison. In the nineteenth century, laurel water was used in Europe (in
appropriate doses) as a medicinal narcotic. At Donnellan's trial, John Hunter (1728-1793), England's
leading surgeon in the 1780s, expressed the view that Boughton had died from natural causes. The
Hunterian Museum of the Royal College of Surgeons of England bears Hunter's name and that of his
brother William (718-1783), also a leading eighteenth-century physician. See THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF
SURGEONS OF ENGLAND, HISTORY OF THE COLLEGE MUSEUMS, at http://www.rcseng.ac.uk/services/
museums/collections-html#hunter (last visited June 17, 2005).
49. DONNELLAN, supra note 47; see also SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT," supra note 34, at
50. I EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 223-24 (1803).
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problem of circumstantial evidence, but were instead based on the
potential unreliability of statements made by accomplices and
defendants. As John Langbein has noted, a series of scandals at
London's Old Bailey in the 172os and early 1730s involving wrongful
convictions "loomed large.., among the concerns that contributed to
the judges' decision to allow defendants to have the assistance of
counsel" capable of disclosing perjured testimony through vigorous
cross-examination.5' A decade later, "the danger of perjured crown
witness testimony" prompted judges at the Old Bailey to adopt the
"corroboration rule," which excluded the uncorroborated testimony of
persons who had turned "state's evidence."52 In the 177os, English judges
began to apply more rigidly the "confession rule," which "disapproved
evidence that the defendant had confessed the crime, unless that
confession had been voluntary"-an inquiry that could result in the
exclusion of confessions deemed to have been secured by either
improper threats or promised concessions. 3 And, in the 179os, British
judges increasingly instructed jurors concerning what came to be known
as the "beyond-reasonable-doubt" standard of proof-initially, it
appears, by instructing jurors to acquit if they had "any rational doubt"
as to a defendant's guilt.'
In short, although concerns about the risk of wrongful execution had
not, by 18oo, led to the abolition of capital punishment in England, they
had provoked prominent English legal commentators to call for strict
application of evidentiary safeguards and had encouraged English judges
to implement significant evidentiary initiatives designed to reduce the
possibility of wrongful conviction and execution. It would remain to be
seen how the substantial attention devoted to the problem of wrongful
execution by English commentators and jurists affected American
criminal justice administrators in the early decades of the Republic and
beyond.
II. RESPONSES TO WRONGFUL EXECUTION IN AMERICA, 1790-1900
By the time the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were ratified in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the
troubling problem of wrongful execution had been recognized and
commented upon in England for roughly 150 years. As in England,
however, constitutional drafters and legislators continued to contemplate
that capital punishment would be used to punish the most serious felony
offenses.5
51. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 157 (2oO3).
52. Id. at 203.
53. Id. at 233.
54. SHAPRO, A CULTURE OF FACT, supra note 34, at 22-23 (emphasis added).
55. Although the most important source of contemporary due process protections, the Fifth
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During the early decades of the nineteenth century, criminal justice
administrators in America pursued a dual strategy with respect to the
problem of wrongful execution. On the one hand, certain American
commentators sought to buttress the legitimacy of the death penalty by
downplaying the risk that fatal errors might occur on this side of the
Atlantic. On the other hand, like their counterparts in England,
American criminal justice administrators adopted certain safeguards
designed to reduce the risk of wrongful execution. These strategies were
the product of complementary motivations: maintaining the legitimacy of
capital punishment while reducing the possibility of catastrophic error.
As we shall see, they characterized, in important ways, the American
response to wrongful execution during the early decades of the nation's
existence.
A. THE CHALLENGE OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION
In 1816, Samuel March Phillipps, an English lawyer, treatise writer,
and future official at the Home Office, published in America his Theory
of Presumptive Proof. The io6-page tract, which had been published two
years earlier in England, was bound as an appendix to Phillipps's
comprehensive and influential Treatise on the Law of Evidence.56 The
Treatise, which went through numerous English and American editions
during the course of the nineteenth century, capably surveyed the
evidentiary rules governing competency, disqualification for interest, and
hearsay. The Theory of Presumptive Proof, by contrast, offered a
radically different perspective: studded with examples of wrongful
convictions and executions, it presented a searing indictment of the
dangers of circumstantial evidence in capital cases.
Phillipps started his Theory of Presumptive Proof by noting that
"[t]he nature of circumstantial evidence, ha[d] never.., formed the
subject of any disquisition in the English language.""7 He then proceeded
to portray, in dire terms, the dangers of excessive reliance on
circumstantial evidence in capital cases. Phillips first noted that, although
Amendment also expressly contemplates-on three occasions-the use of capital punishment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury... ; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. ")
(emphases added). On the status of capital punishment in America in the late eighteenth century, see
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 24-11I (2002); Louis P. MASUR, RITES
OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at
25-70 (1989).
56. S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES BY JOHN A. DUNLAP (N.Y., Gould, Banks & Gould I816) [hereinafter
PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF]. Phillipps served as Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home
Office from 1827 to 1848.
57. Id. at i.
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it had been popular in recent times to "descant upon the certainty of
circumstantial evidence,"' he observed that "too many instances ...
[could] be produced of innocent persons having fallen victims to that
species of proof."' 9 Reflecting on Justice Buller's instruction to the jury in
the Donnellan case that circumstantial evidence was "more satisfactory"
than "any other kind of evidence,"" Phillipps criticized Buller's charge as
"repugnant to the received principles of jurisprudence," "not warranted
by experience," "new to the practice of ... English law," "extra judicial,"
and "of dangerous example.",6' Although trained in the common law,
Phillipps praised the detailed rules governing the treatment of
circumstantial proof developed by Roman and civilian authorities.6 And
in a political and legal culture where commentators still lauded the jury
as an important political safeguard, he criticized the logical leaps taken
by English juries, drawing upon the philosophy of Francis Bacon in
observing that the human mind "imagin[es] parallel correspondence and
relations betwixt [events] which have no existence." 6'
Phillipps punctuated his critique of circumstantial evidence by
relying on roughly a dozen cases from England, Scotland, and France-
including the sad tale of the Perrys-in which persons had been
convicted and, in some cases, executed wrongfully. Phillipps's parade of
innocents included James Crow, executed for burglary in 1727 after
being mistakenly identified as one Thomas Geddeley, who himself was
later identified, arrested, and executed in Dublin; John Jennings, hanged
for highway robbery in 1742 before Jennings's master confessed to
having planted the stolen coins on the unfortunate Jennings; and John
Miles, executed for the murder of William Ridley, who was later
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at i.
6o. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF, supra note 56, at 24, 46.
62. Continental evidentiary regimes typically relied on elaborate gradations of proof, which
distinguished between the strength of eyewitness, circumstantial, and other forms of evidence. See
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978).
63. PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF, supra note 56, at 46. Anticipating modern writing in the area
of cognitive psychology and the law, Phillipps conjectured that jurors' desire for orderly narratives
predisposed them to the prosecutor's story:
In the general prejudice, which at present prevails for circumstantial evidence, the mind, I
am afraid, is rather disposed to look out for analogies and resemblances, [rather] than for
discrimination.
In almost every trial, it is in the interest of the accuser to accumulate his proofs, whilst the
safety of the prisoner consists in considering these, separate and apart; this practice,
therefore, has a tendency rather to convict than to acquit.
Id. at 49. For a modern analysis of juror cognition, see Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box:
Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004). For a modern defense
of legal "story telling," see STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON'T,
CAN'T, AND SHOULDN'T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH (2001) (defending legal narratives as an
appropriate means of providing jurors with coherent theories of the case).
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determined to have fallen into a privy after engaging in a drinking
session with Miles.4
Although such cases were, in Phillipps's view, "superior to all
general argument and abstract theory,"6' he nonetheless proposed a
series of evidentiary rules designed to protect criminal defendants from
being wrongfully convicted and executed. Not surprisingly, given the
urgings of Hale and Blackstone and the fact patterns of several of the
cases that he described, Phillipps first urged that "[tihe actual
commission of the crime itself (the corpus delicti) ... be clearly
established" before a person could be convicted. 66 Although reluctant to
set forth "a technical system for the belief or disbelief of facts," Phillipps
nonetheless proposed twelve additional rules designed to reduce the risk
that circumstantial evidence might lead to legal error. Phillipps's
suggestions included requiring "distinct proof" of all circumstances in a
chain of proof, recognizing the challenges faced by suspects in "proving
the negative," permitting defense counsel "to object freely to the
production of any evidence," and ensuring that the jury "shall be as fully
convinced of the guilt of the prisoner, from the combination of the
circumstances, as if direct proof had been brought."67
At first blush, the cases of wrongful execution chronicled by
Phillipps might appear to have been too idiosyncratic and too
geographically scattered to have had much chance of encouraging
American judges to adopt evidentiary protections in capital cases. 68 But
although the European cases that he narrated undeniably possessed a
certain picaresque quality,69 criminal justice administrators in America
64. Crow (robbery, 1727), PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF, supra note 56, at 78-81; Jennings
(highway robbery, 1742), id. at 65-69; and Miles (murder, n.d.), id. at 8i-85. In the case of
Crow/Geddeley, "the resemblance between the two men was so exceedingly great, that it was next to
impossible for the nicest eye to have distinguished their persons asunder." Id. at 81. In the case of
Ridley, "the floor of the necessary [i.e., privy] had been taken up the morning before the death" and
"a couple of boards had been left up," apparently resulting in Ridley-who was "much in liquor"-
falling into "the vault, which was uncommonly deep." Id. at 84. The other individuals alleged by
Phillipps to have been wrongfully executed included Thomas Harris (murder, 1642) (witness provided
false testimony); William Shaw (murder, 1721) (victim's suicide note later discovered); Jonathan
Bradford (murder, 1736) ("true" killer later confessed); and an unnamed parricide (murder, n.d.)
(daughter of victim later confessed).
65 . PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF, supra note 56, at ii. Phillipps omitted several other cases
because they had already been discussed in contemporary English publications. Id. at ii-iii. He
cautioned his readers, as well, that he did not claim to have identified all instances of wrongful
execution that might have transpired. According to Phillipps, "[vlarious instances occur, of the fatal
error having been too late discovered; but who can say, how many instances have occurred, where the
mistake has never been discovered?" Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 56 (italicization modernized).
67. Id.
68. Indeed, Phillipps himself described the cases as "irregular." Id.
69. We might imagine that narratives of such cases appealed to contemporary tastes in the same
way that the tale of "the return of Martin Guerre" appealed both to residents of early modern France
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were soon forced to confront the stark realities of these cases and, in
time, of their own domestic miscarriages of justice as well.
B. AMERICAN RESPONSES TO WRONGFUL EXECUTION
How did American lawyers, judges, and legal commentators in the
early decades of the nineteenth century respond to the undeniable fact
that persons-including those within their lifetimes-had been executed
for crimes that had never occurred at all?
i. Denial
Consider, first, the case of John Canton and Charles Redding, tried
at the Court of General Sessions in New York City in 1817 on a charge of
robbing Thomas Ogden on the highway. The prosecution's case was
circumstantial, and included an imperfect description of the perpetrators
by the victim, a statement by a "vagrant" then confined in the
penitentiary, and the fact that one defendant had been found with "two
braces of small brass-barrelled pistols" in his possession and the other
with a "watch key" that the victim believed to be his, "though he [clould
not be positive. '7
At the close of the prosecution's case, the defendants' counsel,
Barent Gardenier, employed a novel tactic: he "commenced reading to
the jury several cases from Phillip[p]s's A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence, under the head[ing] of 'presumptive proof."''7' Among the
cases narrated by Gardenier was the regrettable story of Jennings,
executed after having been found with stolen coins in his possession
though "continuing to the last to declare his innocence."72 But Gardenier
did not stop there. He proceeded to read to the jury "several" more cases
of wrongful execution that had been identified by Phillipps, concluding
his catalog of error by "expatiating" to the jury "on the danger of relying
on circumstantial testimony."73
The presiding judge, Mayor Jacob Radcliff, apparently did not take
well to Gardenier's forensic strategy. In Radcliff's instruction to the jury,
and more modern audiences. See NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, THE RETURN OF MARTIN GUERRE (1983).
70. Case of John Canton and Charles Redding (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1817), in DANIEL ROGERS,
THE NEW-YORK CITY-HALL RECORDER, FOR THE YEAR 1817, at 149-50 (Dennis & Co., Inc., 1953) (1817)
[hereinafter Canton & Redding's Case]. The victim, Thomas Ogden, "could not swear that the
prisoners at the bar were the men, yet their general appearance corresponded with the idea that he
had formed of the robbers." Id. at 150. George Henry, a "vagrant" confined in the penitentiary, stated
that he had previously seen the suspects with a watch and pocket book and heard thean bragging that
they had "obtained the watch from a gentleman on the Third Avenue, who was in a carriage with a
lady." Id.
71. Id. at 15t. To be precise, the cases recited by Gardenier appeared in Phillipps's Theory of
Presumptive Proof, which was appended to the first American edition of Phillipps's Treatise, published
in 1816.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 151-52.
HISTORY OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION
he cautioned that "the cases read by the counsel for the prisoner.., were
extreme" and "such as do not exist, perhaps, in one case in a thousand."74
Radcliff then urged the jurors not to give undue credence to Phillipps's
tract:
The plain, practical rules of evidence, which had been established for
ages, ought not to be shaken by any collection of cases in the works of
theoretical writers. Such cases... may be inserted for the purpose of
inducing the greater caution in juries; but, if employed for any other
purpose, their application to the generality of cases, depending on
circumstantial testimony, is dangerous to the extreme.75
According to Radcliff, as many as "one half of the cases tried in our
courts, depends on a combination of circumstances," and "to apply
extreme cases in such determination, would be sapping some of the most
salutary rules known to our law." 76 After receiving this extensive and
strenuous charge, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the
defendants were sentenced to the New York State Prison for life.77
In criticizing Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof as
"theoretical," "dangerous," and "extreme," Radcliff sought to repel the
vigorous attack on circumstantial evidence launched by Phillipps and
Gardenier. But criticisms of Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof
were not confined to trial judges responsible for ensuring order in
American courtrooms. In his report of Canton and Redding's Case
published in The New-York City-Hall Reporter, a collection of early
nineteenth-century criminal cases from New York City, Daniel Rogers
also sharply criticized Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof, noting
that its "sole object" appeared to be "to show that the plain, practical
rules, by which courts have been governed in cases depending on
circumstantial evidence, are objectionable. 8 In Rogers's view, Phillipps
had unfairly brought into question the reliability of circumstantial
evidence by failing to recognize the many instances in which direct,
eyewitness testimony had also proved untrustworthy.79 According to
Rogers, "by ransacking the English annals, or the reports of adjudicated
cases," Phillipps might well have "selected eleven cases in which verdicts
had been rendered on direct proof... but in which the witness or
witnesses ... were guilty of the foulest perjury. ' In Rogers's view,
Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof at best "afford[ed] amusement
to men of speculative minds," especially because its many
74. Id. at 152.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id. As the instruction to the jury noted, "[ajll human testimony is fallible[,] but juries in their
decisions must rely on such testimony." Id.





recommendations concerning the treatment of circumstantial evidence
were "too subtle and refined for the comprehension of common jurors."8'
Echoing the position of Mayor Radcliff, Rogers urged that judges
"discard loose and specious speculations, and strictly adhere to those
rules ... [that have been] founded on the wisdom and experience of
ages.,, 82
Phillipps fared little better with Esek Cowen, the American
annotator of his distinguished Treatise on the Law of Evidence. Cowen
observed that, although Phillipps's Treatise contained "some very
sensible remarks," the cases identified by Phillipps in his Theory of
Presumptive Proof had "furnished our criminals... with a ready
magazine of defensive armour" and "were, for some time, rung through
our criminal courts as seriously impugning the doctrine which
sanctions... [circumstantial] evidence.""8 As a result, "[w]eak juries were
sometimes alarmed... and judges felt bound peremptorily to interpose,
in order to maintain the best settled principles in the law of evidence.""4
Addressing Phillipps's cases in turn, Phillipps's principal American
annotator attributed the errors to "fraud, perjury, conspiracy, a
81. Id.
82. Id. at 152.
83. ESEK COWEN, NOTES TO PHILLIPPS' TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 562, 556 (185o)
[hereinafter COWEN, NOTES]. Cowen served as the official reporter of the New York Supreme Court
(1823-1828) and as an Associate Justice of the New York Supreme Court (1836-1844). For
biographical details, see Historical Society of the Courts of the State of New York, at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/Gallery.B.htm.
Evidence of the use of Phillipps's attack on circumstantial evidence by other early nineteenth-
century American defense lawyers is fragmentary but suggestive. The 185o annotation to Phillipps's
Treatise suggests that similar arguments were raised in the United States Circuit Court for the District
of New York in both United States v. Jacobson (1817) and United States v. Jones (1824). In Jacobson, a
case involving the alleged willful destruction of a sailing ship, the trial judge responded to an objection
by defense counsel that the case was "merely circumstantial" by stating that "[tihe rule... , even in
capital cases, is that should the circumstances of a case be sufficient to convince the mind, and remove
every rational doubt, the jury is bound to place as much reliance on such circumstances as on direct
and positive proof; for facts and circumstances cannot lie." United States v. Jacobson, 26 F. Cas. 567,
567 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 15,461). Although the report of the case does not reveal whether the trial
judge was specifically responding to an attempted use of Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof by
defense counsel, Phillipps's American annotator observed suggestively that the case was tried "shortly
after" the work's publication the previous year. COWEN, NOTES, supra, at 562. The 185o edition of
Phillipps's Treatise further observed that "[s]imilar resorts" to those attempted in Jacobson were
pursued a few years later in United States v. Jones. In Jones. a case involving "piratical murder," the
trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
A number of cases have been cited and read, to show you the dangerous tendency of this
kind of proof. It is possible an innocent person may have suffered; but such cases (if any
such there were) could be no objection to this kind of evidence [i.e., circumstantial
evidence]. If jurors were to disregard it, there would be an end to the administration of law,
and to government. It is the duty of the jury to weigh all the evidence for and against the
prisoner; and fair and legal inferences are to be made from facts and circumstances. They
are often more satisfactory and conclusive than the testimony of witnesses.
26 F. Cas. 644, 648 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 15,493).
84. COWEN, NOTES, supra note 83, at 556.
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prejudiced jury, professional error and mistake of witnesses, the
misapprehension of direct testimony and its accidental non-correction"
and "an alleged want of sagacity" in the trial judge-but not to any defect
in circumstantial evidence or the administration of criminal justice per
se.85
Thus, as with certain modern-day proponents of capital
punishment,8 6 some influential observers in early nineteenth-century
America simply responded to English and European cases of wrongful
execution by denying the existence of the problem or by questioning
their relevance to the American case.
Yet, while certain American commentators in the early decades of
the nineteenth century might seek to explain away such errors as the
product of corrupt ancien regime justice, they might well find it more
distressing to confront such travesties at home. For in the second decade
of the nineteenth century, as Stuart Banner has noted, American
criminal justice administrators would be forced to confront "the first
nationally known American cases of apparently innocent people
executed or condemned."8' The realization that American criminal
justice might itself be susceptible to fatal error-just like the English
system from which it derived-created additional challenges for
American criminal justice administrators.
Consider, first, the curious and tortuous case of the Boom brothers
of Vermont. In 1812, Russell Colvin, a local eccentric prone to
wandering, disappeared from his home in Manchester, Vermont. 8 His
brothers-in-law, Jesse and Stephen Boom, were suspected of Colvin's
disappearance, but the body of Colvin, the supposed victim, could not be
found. 89 After seven years had passed, and long after initial suspicion had
dissipated from the brothers, a relative of the two suspects claimed to
have experienced a dream in which Colvin had appeared to him.'"
Interest in Colvin's disappearance and presumed murder revived
and, during the course of a renewed investigation, a dog uncovered some
bones believed to be those of Colvin.9 ' Upon the basis of this new
"evidence," which seemed, by the "scientific" standards of the day, to
demonstrate conclusively that Colvin had been killed, Jesse Boom was
imprisoned. Thereafter, a convicted forger in an adjacent cell claimed to
85. Id. at 558.
86. See, e.g., Cassell, Defense, supra note 12.
87. BANNER, supra note 55, at 122 (citing cases).
88. GERALD W. MCFARLAND, THE "CouNTERFEIT" MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF THE BOORN-COLVIN
MURDER CASE 4-6 (I99o)
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 49.
91. Id. at 59.
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the authorities that Jesse had confessed.92 When confronted with his
alleged jailhouse statement, Jesse placed the blame on his brother
Stephen, who had relocated to New York and was apparently believed
by Jesse to be outside the jurisdiction of the Vermont courts.93 Tracked
down and arrested in New York, Stephen ultimately confessed to killing
Colvin in self-defense, likely concluding-quite sensibly-that the
decision of Jesse to accuse him of Colvin's killing rendered his prospects
for acquittal rather dim.94 Instead, both brothers were tried, convicted,
and sentenced to death. Although the Vermont legislature commuted
Jesse's sentence to life imprisonment, it declined to respite the sentence
of Stephen-seemingly, the more culpable of the two.95
Supporters of the condemned man then undertook a concerted
effort to find Colvin, placing advertisements in regional newspapers
containing descriptions of the man they believed to be merely missing,
and not dead. 6 Shortly before Stephen Boorn was to have been
executed, Colvin miraculously re-emerged after a resident of New York
City had read the description of Colvin in a local newspaper and notified
the Boorns' representatives that a man fitting Colvin's description was
living in New Jersey.97 Colvin's "triumphant" return to Vermont secured
the release of both of his erstwhile "killers."
98
Not surprisingly, opponents of the death penalty in nineteenth-
century America and England seized upon the problem of wrongful
execution to argue that the administration of the death penalty involved
intolerable risk. In the 184Os, the American abolitionist Lydia Maria
Child wrote, in her Letters from New York, of the case of a German
immigrant to New York who had been executed only to have the real
perpetrator confess upon her deathbed.99 Indeed, as late as 1877, James
Carson expressed the view, in his Capital Punishment is Murder
Legalized, that the seventeenth-century case of the Perrys and other
notorious instances of wrongful execution in both England and America
made him "fearlessly assert that hundreds of persons are executed who
are not proved guilty; and many of them, perhaps, are altogether
innocent of the crime laid to their charge.""°
But if the prospect of wrongful execution provided inspiration to
92. Id. at 65.
93. Id. at 66.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id. at io6-15.
96. Id. at i16-20.
97. Id. at 123-25.
98. Id. at 128-3o. The Booms' attorney later published a short history of the case. See LEONARD
SARGEANT, THE TRIAL, CONFESSIONS AND CONVICTION OF JESSE AND STEPHEN BOORN FOR THE MURDER OF
RUSSELL COLVIN; AND THE RETURN OF THE MAN SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED (1873).
99. LYDIA MARIA CHILD, LETTERS FROM NEW-YORK 215-16 (1843).
100. JAMES C.L. CARSON, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS MURDER LEGALIZED 174-75 (3d ed. 1877).
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opponents of the death penalty, how did it affect nineteenth-century
American criminal justice administrators?
2. The Corpus Delicti Rule
As many American jurisdictions (at least in the North) during the
early decades of the nineteenth century increasingly restricted capital
punishment to those convicted of intentional murder, trial judges were
placed in a position to institute one measure that would reduce the risk
of wrongful executions in which persons, in truth, had never been killed.
By requiring that the corpus delicti rule be strictly enforced, i.e., by
ensuring that a murder had actually been committed before placing a
defendant on trial for his life, embarrassing incidents such as those
involving the Perrys and Boorns could be avoided."' By 1791, the English
treatise writer Capel Lofft felt confident that the rules "laid down" with
respect to proof of the corpus delicti were not "likely to be overlooked"
by either lawyers or judges-at least in England."°' Moreover, one might
have expected the sorry experience of the Boom case to have
encouraged American judges in the antebellum era to think very
carefully about placing persons on trial for their lives when the bodies of
their alleged victims could not be found.
As a practical matter, however, nineteenth-century American judges
faced difficult questions in determining how strictly the corpus delicti rule
should be applied in cases of suspected murder. On the one hand, the
prospect of a "victim" appearing back at the scene of the "crime," while
remote, had certainly been proven possible. As such, the phenomenon
possessed the worrisome capacity to call the administration of the death
penalty into serious question. On the other hand, commentators on
criminal justice administration expressed the concern that particularly
cunning criminals not be allowed to manipulate the corpus delicti
doctrine as a means of avoiding conviction. Addressing the latter
concern, the treatise writer W.M. Best noted in 1876 that it would be "a
IoI. "By 186o no northern state punished with death any offense other than murder and treason,"
and many limited the capital sanction to first-degree (intentional) murder. BANNER, supra note 55, at
131. Although states in the South "moved nearly as far as the North in ceasing to execute whites for
crimes other than murder," many other felonies "remained capital on the books." Id. at 139-40.
Although "the list of capital crimes for whites in the antebellum South was much longer than in the
North, it was far shorter than the corresponding list for southern blacks." Id. at 140-41.
In2. The full quotation is, admittedly, rather difficult to parse:
Two Rules are laid down by Lord C. J. Hale, and these in the present state of the
Administration of criminal Justice, to the perfecting of which that great man so eminently
contributed, are rather hints to the student on the Theory than requisite to be called to
remembrance in the practice: for we are not now in times in which they are likely to be
overlooked. They are, never to indict of stealing the goods of an unknown person till it
appear by due proof that a felony has actually been committed on those goods. Never to
convict of Murther or Manslaughter, unless the fact can be proved to be done, or at least the
body were found.




startling thing to proclaim to every murderer that, in order to secure
impunity to himself, he has nothing to do but consume or decompose the
body by fire, [or] by lime, or... to sink it in an unfathomable part of the
sea."' 3 In cases before them, American trial judges demonstrated similar
sensitivity that prosecutions for heinous crimes not be thwarted by an
unduly rigid application of the corpus delicti rule. Thus, in United States
v. Matthews, a case concerning an alleged murder at sea, the court
determined that requiring the body of the victim to actually be seen after
the victim's death "would afford the most complete protection and
indemnity from the worst offences, and would amount to an unusual
condonation of all murders committed on the high seas"-since corpses,
in such circumstances, were unlikely to be retrieved. 4
Additionally, in the highly-publicized case of Commonwealth v.
Webster, which involved the disappearance and suspected murder of
Professor George Parkman of Harvard, the accused was believed to have
murdered Parkman and disposed of the body.'°5 There, the trial court
determined that the case could go to the jury even though the only
physical evidence of the corpus delicti was "a great number of fragments
of human bones and certain blocks of mineral teeth, imbedded in slag
and cinders, together with small quantities of gold, which.., were found
in an assay furnace of the laboratory" in which the accused had
worked.' 6 Determining on appeal that this physical evidence constituted
sufficient proof of the corpus delicti, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
observed that "most men, conscious of criminal purposes, and about the
execution of criminal acts, seek the security of secrecy and darkness."'"
According to Shaw, if courts and juries did not avail themselves of
circumstantial evidence in criminal proceedings, it would be impossible
to estimate "how many criminal acts committed in the community,
destructive of its peace and subversive of its order and security, would go
wholly undetected and unpunished. ''c s
103. BEST, supra note 21, at 787.
104. 26 F. Cas. 1205, 1207 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 15 ,7 4 ib) (citing Justice Story's remarks in
United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204)).
105. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 296 (185o).
io6. Id. at 299; see also CHRISTOPHER JOYCE & ERIC STOVER, WITNESSES FROM THE GRAVE: THE
STORIES BONES TELL 45-53 (1991); PHILLIPPS, FAMOus CASES, supra note 24, at 47-49; ROBERT
SULLIVAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. PARKMAN 144-45 (1971).
io7. Webster, 59 Mass. at 311.
io8. Id. Shaw further noted:
The advantages [of circumstantial evidence] are, that, as the evidence commonly comes
from several witnesses and different sources, a chain of circumstances is less likely to be
falsely prepared and arranged, and falsehood and perjury are more likely to be detected
and fail of their purpose. The disadvantages are, that a jury has not only to weigh the
evidence of facts, but to draw just conclusions from them; in doing which, they may be led
by prejudice or partiality, or by want to due deliberation and sobriety of judgment, to make
hasty and false deductions ....
Id. at 312.
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Although American judges in cases alleging murder permitted cases
to go to juries even where bodies could not be found, defense lawyers in
such cases continued to press trial judges to apply the corpus delicti rule
strictly. At times, they succeeded in doing so. In the Ruloff case, decided
by the New York Court of Appeals in 1858, the appellant had been
convicted of murdering his infant child."'9 The evidence at trial showed
that Ruloff "did not live happily with his wife"; that his wife and infant
had last been seen by a neighbor on June 24, 1845, but by no one since;
that on June 25, Ruloff had borrowed a wagon from a neighbor and had
used it to carry a box from his home to an unknown location; that Ruloff
had later returned with the wagon, the box, and his wife's ring and shawl;
that he had told stories "as to her being at sundry places where she was
proved not to have been"; that he had "a cast iron mortar of twenty-five
or thirty pounds weight, and flat irons, which on searching... [his] house
were not found"; and, finally, that he had fled to Chicago, where he
claimed that his wife and children had drowned in the Illinois River." '
At trial, Ruloff's lawyer moved for a directed verdict on the grounds
that "no direct evidence of death or the murder of the infant daughter
had been given .... The trial judge denied the motion, and the jury later
convicted Ruloff." ' The appellate court reversed and, in doing so,
canvassed the now-familiar range of Anglo-American sources bearing on
the dangers of circumstantial evidence and wrongful execution: Coke,
Hale, Blackstone, Phillipps's Theory of Presumptive Proof, and various
nineteenth-century Anglo-American treatises on circumstantial
evidence."3 After surveying these materials, the appellate court
concluded that there was "no judicial authority warranting [a] departure"
from "Lord Hale's rule" that required "certain proof that some one is
dead to be the ground on which.., an accused person is to be convicted
of murder.""..4
During the nineteenth century, American judges struggled to
determine how strictly to apply the corpus delicti rule in cases where
bodies could not be found. Wishing to avoid the types of embarrassing
instances of wrongful execution that had marred English criminal justice
administration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that had
nearly come to pass in the Boom case, American judges also sought to
ensure that persons who had committed deadly, clandestine crimes stand
trial for their misdeeds. In short, American judges applied the corpus
delicti doctrine in ways that permitted convictions to be secured but left
lo9. Ruloffv. People, 18 N.Y. 179 (1858).
iIo. Id. at s8o-81.
ii. Id. at 181.
112. Id. at 179-81.
I13. Id. at 185-99.
114. Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added).
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open the troubling possibility that innocent persons would be wrongfully
executed for crimes that had never taken place.
3. Circumstantial Evidence
During the nineteenth century, criminal justice administration in
capital cases continued to demonstrate certain continuities with the
eighteenth century with respect to the treatment of circumstantial
evidence. As in the eighteenth century, some participants in the criminal
justice system expressed concerns about the acceptability of convicting
persons based on circumstantial evidence. And, as in the eighteenth
century, such concerns were occasionally resisted by judges who sought
to preserve circumstantial evidence as an acceptable foundation upon
which to convict persons charged with capital offenses.
Some sense of these enduring tensions can be gleaned by reading
capital cases from those American jurisdictions that allowed jurors to
insist that persons convicted of capital offenses based solely on
circumstantial evidence be spared from execution. In 1874, in Merritt v.
State, the Supreme Court of Georgia described the applicable law in
Georgia as follows:
By the penal code of this state the punishment of murder shall be
death, except when the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial
testimony. When the conviction is had solely on circumstantial
testimony, then it is discretionary with the presiding judge to impose
the death penalty or to sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for life, unless the jury... shall recommend that the
defendant be imprisoned in the penitentiary for life[;] in that case the
presiding judge has no discretion, but is bound to commute the
punishment from death to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary. " '
Thus, Georgia law permitted either juries or judges in capital murder
cases to spare persons from death who were deemed to have been
convicted wholly upon circumstantial evidence.
We know little about the motivations for such sentencing regimes or
how they operated in practice. One suspects that the approach to
circumstantial evidence under the Georgia statute reflected a concern
with both the inherent limitations of circumstantial evidence and a
corresponding desire to mitigate the rigors of the death penalty in
instances where some residual doubt about either culpability or desert
continued to exist." 6 With this said, fragmentary evidence suggests that
115 . Merritt v. State, 52 Ga. 82, 85 (1874) (emphasis added).
i16. The model jury charges of certain states continue to evince similar reservations about the
status of circumstantial evidence. Although defendants in capital cases tried in federal court may be
convicted solely on circumstantial evidence, "many states that allow the death penalty permit a
conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence only if such evidence excludes to a moral certainty
every other reasonable inference except guilt." United States v. Qinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing, by way of example, practice in Arkansas, Indiana, and New York) (emphasis
added).
[VOL. 56: 1185
HISTORY OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION
juries may have sought to spare defendants from death not only in those
cases where they considered the evidentiary foundations of the case to be
suspect. In Merritt, for example, the jury attempted to insist that the
woman whom they had convicted of murder be sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment even when she had "picked up a knife,... rolled up
her sleeves, opened the knife, approached [the] deceased,... [and]
stabbed and struck [the] deceased in the right breast, immediately under
the right nipple."".7 Although the jury may have believed that the
condemned woman had taken up the knife with some justification-in
order to deal with an especially annoying neighbor--the evidence was
anything but circumstantial. Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed the jury's attempted sentence of life imprisonment, finding that
ample direct evidence had been present in the case and, thus, that the
jury lacked the ability under Georgia law to insist on a term of life
imprisonment. '
Although the state of Georgia, at least in theory, provided jurors
with some latitude to mitigate the sentences of persons convicted solely
upon circumstantial evidence, other American jurisdictions sought to
ensure that potential jurors whose evidentiary sensitivities were overly
refined be excluded from jury service in capital cases altogether. Under
Alabama law, for example, the prosecution was permitted to challenge
for cause any person who had either "a fixed opinion against capital, or
penitentiary punishment" or who thought that "a conviction should not
be had on circumstantial evidence.""..9 At the trial of George Jackson,
charged in 1882 with the murder of one Adam Howard in Montgomery,
Alabama, a venireman named A.N. Noble stated that he was "opposed
to hanging on circumstantial evidence," though "not opposed to a
conviction."' 0 Agreeing with the decision of the trial judge to strike
Noble for cause, the appellate court concluded that Noble's "fixed
opinion against capital punishment," as evidenced by his resistance to
convicting upon circumstantial evidence, "was sufficient to disqualify
him .... ' According to Alabama's highest court, the State of Alabama had
sought "to place positive and circumstantial evidence upon the same
basis of equality, so as to abolish all prejudice or discrimination against
them, as media or instrumentalities for arriving at the truth, in the
process of judicial investigation of capital felonies against the State ....
117. Merritt, 52 Ga. at 83-84.
i is8. Id. at 86-88.
119. Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26, 29-30 (1883) (citing Ala. Code § 4883 (1876)).
i2o. Id. at 27.
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id.; see also Garrett v. State, 76 Ala. i8, 20 (1884) (dismissing venireman who stated that "he
would convict on circumstantial evidence, but would not hang on such evidence"); Smith v. State, 55
Ala. 1, 9 (1876) ("It is good ground of challenge for cause by the State, in any case, whether of felony
or misdemeanor, that the juror holds to such an opinion of the law, that he cannot, or will not, convict
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In some jurisdictions, members of the venire who expressed qualms
about circumstantial evidence might be stricken even when such
compunctions had not been specifically identified by the legislature as a
basis upon which to strike for cause. At the outset of a murder trial in
Cooper County, Missouri, in 1878, the venirepersons were polled as to
whether "they would convict one accused of murder on circumstantial
evidence alone.'. 23 All of the potential jurors except one stated that they
would refuse to convict under such circumstances, and the final person
polled acknowledged that he would "have 'scruples in doing so... '.24
Although the statutory law of Missouri-unlike that of Alabama-did
not identify a venireperson's unwillingness to convict upon circumstantial
evidence as a basis upon which to strike for cause, the Supreme Court of
Missouri concluded that the trial court's decision to strike the potential
jurors was proper, on the grounds that "the State has the same right as
the defendant to an impartial jury.'' 25
From our modern-day perspective, it is difficult to appreciate fully
either the source or the strength of this nineteenth-century anxiety
concerning the evidentiary status of circumstantial evidence. What does
seem clear is that, well into the latter decades of the nineteenth century,
both potential and sitting jurors occasionally expressed serious
misgivings about convicting persons of capital offenses based upon
circumstantial proof. However, like their eighteenth-century English
counterparts, American judges at both the trial and appellate levels
struggled to preserve the ability to rely upon circumstantial evidence as a
means of securing convictions in capital cases.
4. Appellate Review
At common law, English defendants convicted of felonies possessed
only the most limited opportunities for post-conviction review.
Defendants could petition the Home Office to have their capital
sentences respited, but success in this endeavor typically depended on
the favorable recommendation of the trial bench. 26 They could challenge
certain aspects of the trial proceedings by way of the writ of error, but
this method of review was essentially restricted to errors apparent on the
face of the underlying record.'27 Most significantly, convicted persons
on circumstantial evidence, however strong it may be.").
123. State v. West, 69 Mo. 401, 402 (1878).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 403 (noting that "[a] juror should be in [a] condition of mind to do exact justice between
the State and the accused").
126. On the pardon process in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see J.M.
BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND I66o-i8oo, at 430-49 (5986).
127. See, e.g., ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994: APPEALS AGAINST
CONVICnON AND SENTENCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996); David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal":
The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518 (i990).
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possessed "no means for correcting the errors of juries...
notwithstanding the inherent probability of error in a human tribunal. '' '28
Indeed, it was not until 1907 that English criminal defendants secured the
ability to have their convictions set aside on the ground that the jury's
verdict was "unreasonable" or could not be "supported... [by] the
evidence.' ' .9
As in England, American criminal defendants historically possessed
the ability to file post-conviction motions alleging legal error in "the
indictment process, the means by which the jury was selected, lack of
jurisdiction in the court, or other procedural irregularities" apparent on
the face of the record. 3' Moreover, during the course of the nineteenth
century, American jurisdictions increasingly permitted defendants-
especially in capital cases -to seek a new trial if the appellate court, in its
discretion, determined "that the verdict was against the weight of
evidence.., or that justice [so] requires."''3' As late as the 1930s,
however, the majority of American jurisdictions continued to deny
persons convicted of felonies the ability to seek review based on the
insufficiency of the evidence."' Reflecting on the state of affairs in
America as late as the 193os, Edwin Borchard observed that "in nearly
all our states the appellate courts can reverse a conviction only for errors
of law," making them "bound by the jury's finding of fact, however
wrong [the appellate court] may consider the conclusion.
' 33
Of course, like today, the prospect that an appellate court might see
fit to identify the commission of a legal error in the proceedings below by
no means ensured that the defendant would be afforded a new trial or
even spared from execution. By the I87os, American courts had
developed the "harmless error" doctrine, which rendered
inconsequential those legal errors deemed by the appellate court not to
have materially affected the jury's verdict of guilt.' 34 In Territory v.
128. PATrENDEN, supra note 127, at 5.
129. In that year, England established a Court of Criminal Appeal-spurred, it should be noted, by
yet another prominent scandal involving a wrongful conviction. Under the i9o7 Act, appeals based
upon disputed issues of fact could be secured by leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or by way of a
"certificate" from the judge who had initially tried the case. PATrENDEN, supra note 127, at 129.
130. Rossman, supra note 127, at 534.
131. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE XXi, XXiii, Xxviii
(932) (citing N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 528).
132. BORCHARD, supra note 131, at xxi; see also id. at xxviii n.4 (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PROPOSED CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 597 (930); NATIONAL COMMISSION OF LAW OBSERVANCE,
REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, No. 8, at 44 (193 1)).
133. BORCHARD, supra note 131, at xxi-xxii ("Contrary to the European practice generally,
evidence of miscarried justice or perjury discovered after final judgment is in many American
jurisdictions no ground for a new trial, because appellate courts maintain their incompetence to
consider it. A petition for executive clemency becomes then the only available remedy.").
134. On "harmless error" analysis, see Martha S. Davis, Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and
Habeas Jurisprudence: The Beast that Swallowed the Constitution, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45 (1999-
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Hargrave (1873), for example, an Arizona territorial court observed that
the series of "harmless errors" that it had detected in the trial
proceedings below
ought not to disturb the judgment in the present case, for they
do not appear to have prejudiced the defendant, and they are
mentioned here only to show that they have not been
overlooked in the examination of the record, and as a caution
in other cases which may be less carefully tried than this one
has obviously been.'
3
In a sample of cases from California in the early twentieth century, the
state's supreme court affirmed capital cases at a rate of ninety-eight
percent- overturning only one out of fifty-eight death penalty cases in
which it rendered decisions on the merits. 16
On balance, the expansion of rights of criminal appeal in nineteenth-
century America appears to have placed appellate judges in a
paradoxical position with respect to the problem of both wrongful
conviction and wrongful execution. On the one hand, through their
ability to identify errors in trial proceedings, appellate judges possessed
the capacity to prevent persons from being wrongfully punished for
crimes that they had not, in fact, committed. On the other hand, as
Lawrence Friedman has observed, the "hypertechnicality" associated
with nineteenth-century appellate decisions also supported the existing
system of criminal justice administration, by furnishing "the appearance
of meticulous justice" that "legitimated and defended the system."'37 Put
differently, although appellate judges possessed the potential to call the
system of criminal justice administration into question, they also had the
ability to legitimate it by characterizing trial-level errors as "harmless,"
by stressing the thoroughness with which they had reviewed the
underlying record, and by assuring readers of their published opinions
that they had approached the issue of the defendant's culpability with
neutrality and detachment.
III. THE PROBLEM OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
How do English and American responses to the problem of
wrongful execution from roughly 1640 to i9oo compare with approaches
to the phenomenon during the last century in America?
As we have seen, Anglo-American legal commentators, lawyers, and
2000).
135- 1 Ariz. 95,96-97 (1873).
136. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 417 (993) (citing
LESTER ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 226 (1939)); see also Ronald H. Beattie, Criminal
Appeals in California, 24 CAL. L. REV. 623, 631 (1936) (cited in ORFIELD, supra, at 226 n.71).
137. FRIEDMAN, supra note 136, at 257-58.
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social reformers from the seventeenth through the early nineteenth
centuries had little difficulty pointing to cases in which persons were
widely believed to have been executed wrongfully and, in turn, in using
such cases to serve their particular goals. In contrast, commentators
seeking to identify and capitalize upon such cases in the modern era face
a set of considerable challenges. At the threshold, persons seeking to
identify instances of wrongful execution confront skeptics who doubt the
historical prevalence of such cases and even their very existence in recent
decades. In turn, a series of procedural barriers-most notably, the
reluctance of prosecutors and judges to permit post-execution testing of
biological samples -have made it difficult for interested parties (typically
public interest groups or members of the press) to identify clear instances
of wrongful execution by testing potentially exculpatory DNA evidence.
Even those cases of wrongful execution that have been identified and
advanced by critics of capital punishment have typically been forced to
compete with powerful "counter-narratives" advanced by judges,
prosecutors, victims, or groups sympathetic to capital punishment, which
typically emphasize the guilt of the condemned, the finality of the jury's
verdict, and the rectitude of the underlying legal proceedings. And while
state and federal courts have been confronted in recent years by
arguments that the risk of executing innocent persons violates
constitutional commitments to due process, virtually all courts have
refused to declare either federal or state death penalty regimes
unconstitutional on such grounds. Finally, certain prominent supporters
of the death penalty continue to argue that wrongful executions-even if
they conceivably occur-are to be anticipated and, at any rate, would be
justified based upon other presumed benefits of maintaining capital
punishment.
A. THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM
In the early decades of the twentieth century, America witnessed a
period of sustained interest in the issues of wrongful conviction and
wrongful execution."" In 1912, the American Prison Congress-the
predecessor of the American Correctional Association-published a
report claiming to have found no cases of wrongful execution in
American history, though the organization's approach of surveying
prison wardens in the United States and Canada about whether they had
"personal knowledge" of such cases did little to inspire confidence in the
survey's methodology.
39
138. For a helpful review of these efforts, see Canada Dep't of Justice, FPT Heads of Prosecutions
Committee Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pubhoplp2.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
139. Robert H. Gault, Find No Unjust Hangings, 3 J. AM. INST. Cram. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 131 (1912).
The warden of Leavenworth Prison, for his part, conceded that he knew of "one or two persons who
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More scholarly and more influential was Edwin Borchard's
Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (1932), which
identified sixty-five convictions in England and America of "completely
innocent people."'4 Borchard, a Professor of Law at Yale University,
attributed the miscarriages of justice to numerous sources of error,
including erroneous eyewitness testimony, false confessions, faulty
circumstantial evidence, and prosecutorial excesses. 4' But Borchard's
study, focused as it was on the phenomenon of wrongful conviction, did
not directly address the problem of wrongful execution. Indeed, many of
the cases identified by Borchard had been identified precisely because
the convicted persons had been sentenced to life imprisonment rather
than death, thus making it more likely that attention would be drawn to
their plights during their lifetimes.
Despite the importance of these pioneering studies, the modern
debate about the prevalence of wrongful execution in the United States
dates from the 198os, most notably with the publication in 1987 of an
article by Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet in the Stanford Law
Review.'42 After first observing that "the risk of executing the innocent is
largely unknown," Bedau (a philosopher) and Radelet (a sociologist)
proceeded to identify 350 cases in which they considered that persons
had been wrongfully convicted for capital or "potentially capital" crimes,
as well as twenty-three cases in which persons they "believe[d] to be
innocent... were executed.' '43 Their list of persons wrongfully executed,
which spanned the period from 1905 to 1974, included several prominent
historical figures, such as Joe Hill (1915), Sacco and Vanzetti (1921), and
Bruno Hauptmann (1935).'" According to the authors, the nineteen
others were "household name[s]" in their day but have now been largely
may ... have been executed wrongfully." Id. (emphasis added).
140. See BORCHARD, supra note 131, at xiii.
141. See id. For later studies, see JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); EDWARD
D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964); Erie Stanley Gardner, Helping the Innocent, 17 UCLA L. REV. 535
(970).
142. Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages]. The paper had been presented by the
authors two years earlier at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Id. at 21. For
an earlier statement exploring similar themes, see Hugo Adam Bedau, Murder, Errors of Justice, and
Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 434-52 (H.A. Bedau ed., 1964) (identifying
seven twentieth-century cases and one nineteenth-century case of wrongful execution).
143. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages, supra note 142, at 23,72-73.
i44. Hill, an early twentieth-century labor leader, was convicted of murdering a grocery store
owner in Salt Lake City in 1914 and killed by a Utah firing squad the year after. See Joe Hill: The Man
Behind the Martyr, at http://www.kued.org/joehill/story/index.html (last visited Apr. i5, 2005). Sacco
and Vanzetti were convicted of robbery and murder in South Braintree, Massachusetts, in 192o and
executed seven years later. See Sacco Vanzetti Project, at http://www.saccovanzettiproject.org/
project.htm. Hauptmann was convicted in New Jersey in 1935 for the kidnapping and murder of the
Lindbergh baby and executed the following year. See Steven Limbaugh, The Case of New Jersey v.
Bruno Richard Hauptmann, 68 UMKC L. REv. 585 (20oo).
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forgotten. '45
The Bedau/Radelet study prompted a sharp response the following
year by Paul Cassell (at the time, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney) and
Stephen Markman (then serving as an official in the Department of
Justice).' 46 Alleging that the Bedau/Radelet study was "severely flawed in
critical respects," Cassell and Markman concluded that the study "wholly
fail[ed] to demonstrate an unacceptable risk of executing the
innocent."'47 Addressing Bedau and Radelet's twenty-three cases of
alleged wrongful execution, Cassell and Markman raised three principal
objections. First, they observed that "only about seven percent of the
study [i.e., twenty-three of 350 cases] deal[t] with cases of allegedly
erroneous execution." Second, they noted that the study's tally of
"wrongful executions" included cases from "the early part" of the
twentieth century, "long before the adoption" of what Cassell and
Markman styled "the extensive contemporary system of safeguards in the
death penalty's administration." Finally, they contended that Bedau and
Radelet's reconstruction of the cases was "one-sided," claiming that
there "appear[ed] to be little resemblance between the authors'
descriptions and the actual cases" as they had transpired. In conclusion,
Cassell and Markman contended that the authors had presented "no
credible evidence that any innocent person ha[d] been executed" since
the early 1970s, when "procedural protections... [were] adopted to
reduce as much as possible the likelihood that error will be committed
or, if committed, that it will go undetected." 8
Since the exchange of these initial salvos in the late I98os, the
leading participants have continued their debate.'49 Suffice it to say that
the skeptics remain unconvinced. In a recent article, Cassell (now a
federal district court judge) has observed that "the claim that innocents
have actually been executed has been repeated by abolitionists so often
Z45. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages, supra note 142, at 74. They were Vance Garner (Alabama,
1905); Charles Louis Tucker (Massachusetts, 1905); Mead Shumway (Nebraska, I9o7); Charles Becker
& Frank Cirofici (New York, 1912); Thomas Bambrick (New York, i915); Albert Sanders (Alabama,
1917); Maurice Mays (Tennessee, i919); Harold Lamble (New Jersey, i92o); Stephen Grzechowiak &
Max Rybarczyk (New York, 1929); Everett Appelgate (New York, 1936); George Chew Wing (New
York, 1937); Roosevelt Collins (Alabama, 1937); Charles Sberna (New York, 1938); Willie McGee
(Mississippi, 1945); William Henry Anderson (Florida, I945); Sie Dawson (Florida, i96o); and James
Adams (Florida, 1974). Id. at 73.
146. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-
Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 12r (1988).
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id. at 122.
149. Compare Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and
Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988), and MICHAEL RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992), with Cassell, Defense, supra note 12, and Barry Latzer & James
N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, 84 JUDICATURE 64 (2O00).
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that it has become something of an urban legend.' ' I. Most recently,
Bedau and Radelet have responded that the prevalence of "close calls"
and other statistical evidence strongly suggest that some innocent
persons have been executed-though they acknowledge that "[c]lose
calls, by themselves, do not provide evidence sufficient to enable us to
point to the innocence of a particular individual defendant who was
executed.'' In sum, although polls have revealed that most Americans
believe that persons convicted of crimes have, indeed, been wrongfully
executed, other prominent commentators remain thoroughly
unconvinced.5 '
B. THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM
In theory, the advent of "the DNA revolution" of the I98os held out
the prospect of a new chapter in the history of wrongful execution by
permitting interested parties to assess the correctness of the verdicts of
persons who had been convicted and executed. Yet, although
breakthroughs in scientific evidence have brought increased attention in
recent decades to the problem of wrongful conviction, they have not
unearthed a similar rash of cases involving wrongful executions. The
reasons for this disparity are many-including the simple fact that more
persons are wrongfully convicted than are wrongfully executed and that
capital defense attorneys understandably focus their attention on the
living rather than the dead. But certain procedural problems also
contribute to the challenge of identifying cases of wrongful execution in
the modern age.
Legal practitioners, scholars, journalism students, politicians, and
investigative reporters have had little difficulty-as a relative matter-in
identifying cases of wrongful conviction over the course of the past three
decades: a recent empirical study of nearly 4,600 capital appeals from
1973 to 1995 demonstrated that the overall rate of prejudicial error was
sixty-eight percent."' Moreover, although the Supreme Court's "actual
150. Cassell, Defense, supra note 12, at 205-06; see also Paul G. Cassell, We're Not Executing the
Innocent, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2000, available at http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/Liebman/
Cassell_Innocents.htm [hereinafter Cassell, Executing the Innocent] ("[C]ontrary to urban legend,
there is no credible example of any innocent person executed in this country under th. modem death-
penalty system.").
151. Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and
Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 587, 590 (2004). For an attempt to assess the statistical likelihood of
wrongful execution, see Joe McKenna, Editorial, Dead Reckoning- Calculating the Odds That
Innocent People Are Being Executed, HARTFORD CouRwr, June 27, 2003, at A13 (cited in Bedau et al.,
Convicting the Innocent, supra).
152. "These [public] opinions persist despite the fact that there is no single defendant who has
been executed in the modem era who has had his innocence so persuasively established that death
penalty advocates such as Markman and Cassell would concede the issue." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 163-64 (2003).
153. See James S. Liebman, Rates of Reversible Error and the Risk of Wrongful Execution, 86
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innocence" doctrine has made it more difficult for persons to launch
legal challenges to their convictions, it remains the case that a significant
(and growing) number of exonerations of death row inmates have
occurred in recent years.'
54
By contrast, efforts to demonstrate that persons have been
wrongfully executed face more significant obstacles. In many instances,
there is no biological evidence available to test. On other occasions,
once-testable material may have become degraded-especially when
years or decades have elapsed since trial.'55 Even when biological
evidence that is capable of being analyzed survives, the resistance of
prosecutors and courts to post-execution DNA testing frequently makes
it difficult to subject the material to scientific scrutiny."56 For example, in
the case of Roger Keith Coleman, who was executed in Virginia in 1992
after being convicted of rape and murder, the court denied a request for
posthumous DNA testing requested by Centurion Ministries-a non-
profit organization dedicated to the vindication of persons who are
"completely innocent"-and by various media organizations.'57  The
petitioners sought to retest existing DNA evidence relating to Coleman's
case on the theory that the improved accuracy of DNA technology in the
roughly nine years since Coleman's conviction had the realistic prospect
to yield a more accurate result. 5' The court refused the petitioners'
request, reasoning that "ordering re-testing of the Coleman DNA at this
stage would have no bearing on the fairness of the death penalty as it is
JUDICATURE 78 (2oo2); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000): see also John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of
the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the "Modern" Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54
S.C. L. REV. 285 (2003).
154. Under the Supreme Court's "actual innocence" doctrine, capital convicts must demonstrate
not simply "actual innocence," but an independent constitutional violation. See Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 416-19 (1993). For treatments of the Supreme Court's "actual innocence" jurisprudence, see
J. Brent Alldredge, Federal Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Claims of Actual Innocence Based on
DNA Evidence, 56 SMU L. REV. 1005 (2003); Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the
Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501 (1996); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts:
The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L.
REV. 1281 (2004); George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency,
and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITr. L. REV. 263 (2003). In recent years, selected states have permitted
convicts to raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence in state post-conviction proceedings. See
Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L.
REV. 421 (2004).
i55. "DNA testing may help prevent some... near-tragedies in the future; but it can only be used
in the minority of cases involving recoverable, and relevant, DNA samples." United States v.
Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
156. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004).
157. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 8o9 (Va. 2002) (affirming lower
court decision). For further details of the case, see JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY (1997).
158. I am indebted to my colleague Richard McAdams for sharing with me his thoughts and
materials relating to the Coleman case.
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now administered or on the public confidence [in] the criminal justice
system."'59 Paradoxically, in the court's view, the scientific methods
available a decade after Coleman's conviction had advanced so
dramatically that a finding of earlier scientific error would have done
nothing to impugn the integrity of current (or, apparently, even previous)
capital convictions.
Of course, whether this resistance to reopening the cases of persons
who have been executed will prove sustainable over time remains
another matter. Franklin Zimring, author of The Contradictions of
American Capital Punishment (2003), has summarized the issue as
follows:
[T]he identification of a DNA-innocent executed defendant would put
a human face on the issue of wrongful execution and provide a poster
child for moratorium campaigning across the nation, so the states are
resisting providing samples in postexecution cases. But as large
numbers of states pass DNA access legislation for living defendants,
the objection to testing when the defendant has been executed will
seem bereft of moral principle.60
Even in cases where potentially exculpatory DNA evidence is not
available, prosecutors have occasionally seen fit to reexamine cases of
executed persons-at least when such cases have been prosecuted by
their predecessors. Shortly before this Article went to press, prosecutors
in Missouri reopened the case of Larry Griffin, executed in 1995 for the
drive-by killing of a nineteen-year-old drug dealer in I980.16' The
evidentiary defects in Griffin's case had been emphasized by two
formidable advocates: the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
and Samuel Gross, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School-" 162
and a leading expert on exonerations.
159. The court posed the issue as follows: "How can investigation of the death penalty as it was
implemented in 1992 be beneficial in scrutinizing the death penalty as it is carried out in 2001 when the
processes are so different?" In re Globe Newspaper Co., No. 211 -oo, slip op. at 8 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 31,
2001) (letter opinion denying petitioners' request for DNA testing). The court conceded that, in the
case of Ellis Wayne Felker, a court in Georgia had permitted the request of four news organizations to
seek post-execution DNA testing based on a Georgia statute that permitted the trial court to "open to
public inspection" any "exhibit tendered to the court as evidence in a civil or criminal trial." GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-I8-7i.i.(a) (1998). Virginia lacked a similar statute. The court's decision to prevent post-
execution testing in the Coleman case was ultimately affirmed on appeal. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 809 (Va. 2002). (The post-execution tests in Felker's case proved
inconclusive.)
16o. ZIMRING, supra note 152, at 191.
16i. See Terry Ganey, Reopening Griffin Case May Sway Debate Over Executions, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 13, 2005, at As, available at 2005 WLNR 1099029o; Terry Ganey, After Execution, Case
Is Reopened, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, July 12, 2005, at AI, available at 2005 WLNR 1o9899o8.
162. For details on the Griffin case, see Letter from Samuel R. Gross, Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School, and Cooperating Attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
and Josiah Thompson, Thompson Investigations, to Saul Green, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone
P.L.C. (June so, 2005), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/Newsandlnfo/griffin-report.pdf.
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Resistance to reopening the cases of persons who have been
executed may also increasingly appear incongruous from an international
perspective, especially given that other common law countries, most
notably Great Britain, have instituted this type of searching scrutiny.
Since its creation in 1997, Great Britain's Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC)-an independent public body established to
investigate suspected "miscarriages of justice" in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland-has already referred two cases to the Court of Appeal
that have resulted in posthumous exonerations of persons who had been
wrongfully hanged.' In 1998, the Court of Appeal quashed the
convictions of Derek Bentley, hanged in 1953 at the age of nineteen for
allegedly murdering a police constable, and Mahmood Hussein Mattan, a
Somali sailor hanged in 1952 for allegedly killing a shopkeeper in
Wales. 6'
Yet despite the successes of the CCRC, the prospect of such an
approach being adopted in any systematic fashion in America appears
remote. First, whereas criminal justice in Britain is capable of being
comprehensively overseen by one Home Office, one appellate court
system, and a single CCRC, responsibility for criminal justice
administration in America is decentralized and less amenable either to
systematic supervision or comprehensive correctives. Second, and more
abstractly, because Britain abolished the death penalty in 1965, the
discovery several decades later of persons demonstrated to have been
wrongfully executed does not call into question the practice of capital
punishment in that nation. Moreover, exonerations of persons executed
in the I950s typically do not challenge the decisions of active prosecutors
or of trial judges currently on the bench.'6 ' Tellingly, despite the creation
163. Established in 1997, the Commission had received 7,782 applications through May 31, 2005,
and had referred 274 cases to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had quashed 155 convictions,
upheld 65, and reserved judgment on three. See Criminal Cases Review Commission, Case Statistics, at
http:/lwww.ccrc.gov.uk/cases/case-44.htm (last visited June 17, 2005). For an overview of the
Commission's work, see Criminal Cases Review Commission Annual Report 2003-2004, available at
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/publications/publicationsget.asp. For academic treatments of the CCRC, see
Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1241 (2001); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the
Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835 (2004); L.H. Leigh, Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The
Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 38 ALBERTA L. REV. 365 (2000).
164. On Bentley, see Bentley Relatives "Thrilled" by Appeal Outcome, BBC NEws, July 30, 1998, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/ukI42343.stm. On Mattan, see http://innocent.org.uk/cases/hhmattan. By
contrast, the Court of Appeal recently upheld the conviction of James Hanratty, hanged in 1962 for
allegedly committing a double murder in Bedfordshire. The Court of Appeal did so in the face of
Hanratty's repeated claims of innocence prior to his execution and the position taken by other
supporters that he was in North Wales at the time of the crime for which he had been convicted. See
Court Dismisses Hanratty Appeal, BBC NEWS, May 1o, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/wales/
1979390.stm.
65. See Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving Towards Moratoria on
Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 746 (2001) ("The
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of numerous commissions designed to investigate defects in the
administration of criminal justice in America, and episodic interest
among prosecutors in reopening certain highly suspect cases, no
American jurisdiction has instituted a body similar to the CCRC that is
charged with systematically "scour[ing] the landscape for individual
injustices."' 66
C. THE NARRATIVE PROBLEM
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, few appear to have
doubted that persons were occasionally executed for crimes that they had
not committed and, indeed, that had never occurred at all. Over time,
more careful application of the corpus delicti rule by trial judges
diminished the prospect that such glaring instances of wrongful execution
would become widely apparent.
This is by no means to suggest that miscarriages of justice were
avoided in either England or America. To the contrary, shameful cases
of wrongful conviction continued to plague Anglo-American criminal
justice administration in the ensuring centuries, from the Scottsboro
case,167 to those of the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four,' to our
recent spate of DNA-related exonerations.' Nonetheless, compared
with the period before i8oo, when instances of wrongful execution were
patently clear, scholars and social activists seeking to identify compelling
instances of wrongful execution in the modern age face a far more
difficult task.
Consider the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell, one of two that figure
prominently in Sister Helen Prejean's recent book The Death of
Innocents. In Sister Helen's retelling, O'Dell is portrayed as having been
caught up in a series of events beyond his control in which he plays no
culpable role. Her rendition is relatively simple. On Tuesday, February 5,
1985, at approximately II:3o p.m., Helen Schartner left the County Line
Lounge in Virginia Beach, Virginia." O'Dell was at the County Line
first reaction by many such judges to an anti-death penalty or moratorium movement would likely be
to resent it, as an implicit criticism of their past rulings.").
166. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333,348 (2002).
I67. On the Scottsboro case, see Michael Klarman, Scottsboro (University of Virginia Public Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17) (Feb. 2005), available at
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva-publiclaw/art'7/.
168. See, e.g., ROBERT KEE, TRIAL & ERROR (1987) (describing case of four persons convicted of pub
bombings in Guildford, England in 1974); CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGEMENT: THE TRUTH ABOUT
THE BIRMINGHAM BOMINcS (rev. ed. 1997) (describing case of six persons convicted of two pub
bombings in Birmingham, England in 1974).
169. On recent DNA-related exonerations, see supra note 2.
17o. This version is compiled from the following sources: PREJEAN, supra note 13, at 62-65; a
monograph O'Dell wrote in jail; and Lori Urs, Commonwealth v. Joseph O'Dell: Truth and Justice or
Confuse the Courts? The DNA Controversy, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 351 (999).
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Lounge that night, but he never met or talked to Schartner. After leaving
the lounge, he got into a fight-in which he was bloodied-in the parking
lot of a bar called the Brass Rail. After two Norfolk police officers
arrived at the scene to break up the fight, O'Dell threw his bloody jacket
into the passenger seat of his car, spattering blood on the seat. When his
girlfriend later became aware of the blood on his clothes, O'Dell falsely
attributed the stains to a bout of bloody vomiting, seeking to avoid the
prospect that his female companion might contact his parole officer and
report unfavorably on his behavior.
In 1986, a Virginia jury convicted O'Dell of capital murder during
the commission of a rape and sodomy by force and, in a separate penalty
phase, sentenced him to death. Although O'Dell sought to have
independent tests conducted on his blood-stained clothing, the
Commonwealth of Virginia failed to keep his articles of clothing under
refrigeration and, as a result, rendered the samples incapable of being
tested. After his post-conviction efforts proved unavailing and his
execution date approached, O'Dell became the subject of fervent
international appeals. Two days before O'Dell's scheduled execution, the
papal nuncio delivered a request to President Bill Clinton on behalf of
Pope John Paul II seeking executive clemency on O'Dell's behalf. A
videotape of a similar request by Mother Teresa was played outside the
prison in which O'Dell was held shortly before his scheduled execution.
O'Dell, for his part, protested his innocence up to his death, which
occurred by lethal injection on July 23, 1997.
But consider the following counter-narrative, drawn from the
opinions of the appellate courts that heard O'Dell's various post-
conviction appeals.' 7' O'Dell left the County Line Lounge within fifteen
minutes of Helen Schartner's departure. At the time, he already had a
lengthy criminal record, having been convicted of a prison murder, of
kidnapping and robbing a woman in Florida in 1975 during an attempted
rape, and of roughly a dozen other felonies. Although the State of
Florida had sentenced O'Dell to a ninety-nine-year term for his
kidnapping/robbery conviction, he had been released on parole in 1983.
Helen Schartner's body was found in a field across the highway from
the County Line Lounge. She had been killed by manual strangulation-
with sufficient force to break bones in her neck. She also had eight
bloody wounds on her head caused by a cylinder-equipped handgun.
Less than three hours after leaving the nightclub, O'Dell had "entered a
convenience store with blood on his face and hands, in his hair, and down
Urs, who worked on O'Dell's case as a paralegal, married O'Dell while he was on death row.
171. This version relies largely on the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in O'Dell v.
Virginia, 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988), which resulted from the automatic post-conviction review in state
court of O'Dell's death sentence.
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the front of his clothes.' '72 At around 7:oo a.m. the following morning,
O'Dell called a woman friend, Connie Craig, to say that he wanted to
speak with her before leaving for Florida. O'Dell then visited Craig's
house, and slept there until 9:30 or io:oo p.m. The following day, O'Dell
called Craig and told her that "he had put his clothes in her garage, but
he intended to take them out the following day.' I73 After Craig read
about Schartner's murder in the local newspaper, she went to her garage
and found a paper bag containing four pieces of bloody clothing,
including jeans with mud on them.
At trial, an expert from the state crime lab and five forensic
scientists testified that the blood on O'Dell's clothing "was the same type
as Schartner's in each of the i i blood classifications analyzed" (a
likelihood of 3 in i,ooo) and that blood found in the passenger seat of
O'Dell's car was also consistent with that of Schartner's. The state also
introduced pubic hairs found in O'Dell's car that were consistent with
those of the victim and a cast of a tire print from the crime scene with
tread elements similar to those on the tires of O'Dell's car. Although a
cylinder-equipped handgun had been seen in O'Dell's car roughly ten
days before Schartner's murder, the gun could no longer be found.
Finally, a jailhouse informant testified that O'Dell had confessed to him
that O'Dell had strangled Schartner after she had refused to have sex
with him. 74 Ten months before O'Dell was executed by lethal injection,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that his
claims of actual innocence were "not even colorable.'
' 75
It is not my intention to pick between these dramatically divergent
narratives. Many impassioned observers of the case have done so
already. The city of Palermo, Italy, for instance, found O'Dell's story to
be so compelling that it made O'Dell an honorary citizen after his death
and flew his body to Italy for burial. I76 On the other hand, the reporter
for the Virginian-Pilot who was assigned to O'Dell's trial has stated that
she has "no doubt-none-that O'Dell was guilty of one of the most
horrible crimes committed here or anywhere."'77 What can be said is that
cases like those of Joseph Roger O'Dell lack the factual undeniability
and moral clarity of cases, like that of the three Perrys, where persons
were convicted and executed for crimes that had never occurred at all.
172. Id. at 495.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 496.
175. O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1218 (4th Cir. 1996).
176. The tombstone reads: "Joseph O'Dell 3rd... honorary citizen of Palermo, killed by Virginia
U.S.A., in a merciless and brutal justice system." Jeffrey Fleishman, Italians Fight U.S. Use of Death
Penalty, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/
o82000-o3.htm.
177. Kerry Dougherty, Debate the Death Penalty, But Not Joseph O'Dell's Guilt, VIRGINtAN-PILOT
(Norfolk), Dec. 21, 1996, available at www.vuac.org/capital/josephodell.pdf.
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To be sure, seventeenth-century observers forwarded differing
explanations for such calamitous events. But few appeared to doubt that
persons had been convicted of crimes that they had not, in fact,
committed.
In the modern age, by contrast, purported instances of wrongful
execution lack this type of clarity. Much like the competing versions of
the crimes narrated in Kurosawa's Rashomon, alleged instances of
wrongful execution offered in the modem age are susceptible to widely
varying interpretations as to their very existence. Moreover, because
modern-day cases of alleged wrongful execution lack the definitiveness
and moral clarity of a case like that of the three Perrys, they are
especially susceptible to being accused of serving legal and political
ends. 79 As a result, contemporary chroniclers of wrongful execution must
not only dislodge the entrenched views of prosecutors, jurors, and judges,
they must also struggle with the allegation that the version of history that
they tell has been crafted to serve the ends they seek to pursue.
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
What is the significance, if any, of wrongful execution considered as
a constitutional problem?
From time to time over the past few decades, members of the U.S.
Supreme Court have expressed serious concern about the risk of
wrongful execution. In his famous dissent in Callins v. Collins (1993), in
which he stated that he would "no longer tinker with the machinery of
death," Justice Blackmun emphasized "the inevitability of factual, legal,
and moral error [that] gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill
some defendants."'8 In Herrera v. Collins (1993), Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy articulated "the fundamental legal principle that executing the
innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution" and stated that a state-
sanctioned killing of this type, were it to transpire, would be "a
constitutionally intolerable event. '' 18 ' And in Atkins v. Virginia (2002),
178. In Kurosawa's RASHOMON (Daiei 1950), four different narrators chronicle a tale of rape and
murder. Because each of the narrators is fallible, it is ultimately impossible to determine the true
nature of the events.
179. See Austin Sarat, Bearing Witness and Writing History in the Struggle Against Capital
Punishment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451 (1996). The practice, of course, goes back to the early modem
period when the Ordinary of Newgate-the chaplain of Newgate prison-sought to craft the stories of
convicted felons to stress their repentance. See LINCOLN B. FALLER, TURNED TO ACCOUNT: THE FORMS
AND FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL BIOGRAPHY IN LATE SEVENTEENTH AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (987); Peter Linebaugh, The Ordinary of Newgate and His Account, in CRIME IN ENGLAND
1550-i8oo, at 246 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977); Andrea McKenzie, Martyrs in Low Life? Dying "Game"
in Augustan England, 42 J. BRrr. STUDS. 167 (2OO3).
18O. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
181. Herrera v. Collins, 5o6 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Regardless of the
verbal formula employed-'contrary to contemporary standards of decency,' 'shocking to the
conscience,' or offensive to a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
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which held that the execution of persons who are mentally retarded
violates the Eighth Amendment, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
rested his opinion in large part on the particular vulnerability of such
persons to wrongful execution. '
Recent developments in the lower courts have addressed more
directly the question of whether the risk of wrongful execution renders
the administration of the death penalty unconstitutional. Most
dramatically, U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff, in 2002, held that the death
penalty, as administered under federal law, was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of both
procedural and substantive due process.' s3 Reflecting on the fact that
over thirty persons on death row had been exonerated over the past
decade, as well as on recent studies finding a sixty-eight percent rate of
prejudicial error in capital cases, the court concluded that "the inference
is unmistakable that numerous innocent people have been executed
whose innocence might otherwise have been similarly established."'' 8 As
the court noted:
[T]he unacceptably high rate at which innocent persons are convicted
of capital crimes, when coupled with the frequently prolonged delays
before such errors are detected (and then often only fortuitously or by
application of newly-developed techniques), compels the conclusion
that execution under the Federal Death Penalty Act, by cutting off the
opportunity for exoneration, denies due process and, indeed, is
tantamount to foreseeable, state-sponsored murder of innocent human
beings."'
Having previously observed that the prospect of executive clemency
was too remote in the modern age to protect the innocent, Judge
people as to be ranked as fundamental'-the execution of a legally and factually innocent person
would be a constitutionally intolerable event.") (internal citations omitted).
182. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Stevens, J.). As Justice Stevens noted, "[m]entally
retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution" because of the
heightened possibility of "false confessions," "the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to
make a persuasive showing of mitigation," the challenges faced by such defendants in assisting counsel
and testifying, the prospect that their "demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of
remorse for their crimes," and the danger that mental retardation will be viewed as a sign of "future
dangerousness." Id. at 320-21.
183. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Congress adopted the FDPA
in 1994. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2005).
t84. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (issuing preliminary order declaring the FDPA to be
unconstitutional and requesting briefing from government on issue). In its preliminary order entered
in April 2002, the court declared that "[n]o system so persistently and systematically fraught with error
can warrant the kind of reliance that would justify removing the possibility of future exoneration by
imposing death." Id. (internal citation removed).
185. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
i86. As the court observed, "there has been a precipitous decline in the number of clemencies
granted in recent years." Quinones, r96 F. Supp. 2d at 420 n.9 (citing BANNER, supra note 55, at 291).
For academic treatments of the operation of clemency in capital cases, see Michael Heise, Mercy by
the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239 (2003); Victoria
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Rakoff declared the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA)'87 to be
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because it denied persons the opportunity to prove their innocence
during their lifetimes.'9
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in a 3-0 decision."" Writing
for the appellate panel, Judge Cabranes first reflected-quite correctly,
as we have seen-that English legal commentators had "recognized that
capital punishment inherently entails a risk that innocent people will be
executed" by the time the Bill of Rights was ratified in 179 ."
Concluding that the court below had "erred in looking to 'evolving
standards' in conducting its due process analysis," the appellate court
then determined that American jurisdictions have never recognized a
fundamental right "to exonerate oneself throughout the natural course of
one's life..' 9' To the contrary, the Supreme Court, in Judge Cabranes's
view, had specifically rejected that position in its 1993 decision in
Herrera.'92
Other federal and state courts that have been confronted with
similar challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty have
agreed with the position taken by the Second Circuit in Quinones." In
J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death
Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. Rv, 311 (1996).
187. i8 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2005).
188. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
189. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3 d 49 (2d Cir. 2002) (Cabranes, J.).
I90. Id. at 63 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (Robert Heward ed., 1830)
(circa 1775)). As the appellate court noted, "the argument that innocent people may be executed-in
small or large numbers-is not new; it has been central to the centuries-old debate over both the
wisdom and the constitutionality of capital punishment." Id.
191. Id. at 61, 62. The lower court had held that "due process is, virtually by definition, an evolving
concept that takes account of current conditions and new discoveries, as well as heightened moral
awareness" and that "[t]o freeze 'due process' in the precise form it took in 1787 would be to freeze it
to death." Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 26o (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833,846-51 (1992); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (952)).
192. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 52. By contrast, the district court read the case more narrowly,
concluding that "Herrera does not address the issue presented in the instant case .... [T]he Herrera
Court's sole holding is that a belated or successive habeas petitioner must make a persuasive showing
of actual innocence to warrant habeas relief." Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
193. Federal cases: United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3 d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Whatever the
risk that another person will be wrongfully convicted, Robinson has not even attempted to show...
that his conviction is erroneous, and he has presented no evidence to suggest that the FDPA is
unconstitutional as applied to his case."); United States v. Perez, No. 3: 02cr 7 (JBA), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7500, at *6 n.2 (D. Conn. Apr. 29, 2004) (noting that "the Second Circuit... [has] rejected the
claim that growing evidence that innocent people are being executed requires abolition of the death
penalty as violative of due process"); United States v. Mikos, No. 02CRI 3 7-I, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
i6o44, at *53 (N.D. Ill. Sept. t1, 2003) ("The recent results from DNA research demonstrate what
society already knows-our system of justice is imperfect. However, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged this imperfection and continued to allow for the imposition of capital punishment.");
United States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d I250, 1253-54 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("This case, as any federal death
case, will be presided [over] by a judge appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, with a
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short, as Carol and Jordan Steiker have suggested in a recent "thought
piece" entitled "Abolition in Our Time," the Supreme Court has never
required "perfection" in administration of the death penalty as a matter
of due process and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.'"
E. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
In arguing that Congress, when it passed the FDPA in 1994, could
not have intended that it take the life of innocent persons, Judge Rakoff
reasoned that "cold-blooded utilitarianism" would be "uncharacteristic"
of that legislative body, "which, experience suggests, is much more likely
to favor the Kantian, 'Golden Rule' approach characteristic of the
world's great religions." Under this approach, suggested the court, "the
relevant question would presumably be: 'Are you prepared to apply to
yourself a legal process that would execute you for a crime you never
committed before you were able to finally prove your innocence?" '...
It is by no means clear to me that Congress or other prominent
participants in the administration of the nation's death penalty at either
the federal or state level operate with the Kantian categorical imperative
in mind. Nor does it seem likely that the death penalty engages the
empathy of legislators in the way Judge Rakoff suggests that it should.
To the contrary, legislators throughout history have grudgingly extended
life term as provided by the United States Constitution."); United States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d
700, 702 (W.D. Va. 2002) ("The federal experience with death penalty cases certainly does not support
an argument that the federal court system is likely to convict the truly innocent"); United States v.
O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-oi-00277, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25845 at *8-) (M.D. Pa. Sept. I6, 2002) ("Trials
conducted under the Federal Death Penalty Act, supervised by Article III judges, provide more
procedural safeguards than afforded in most state judicial systems"). But see United States v. Fell, 217
F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that the evidentiary regime associated with the FDPA's "death-
eligibility" factors failed to satisfy constitutional mandates), rev'd, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 369 (2004).
State cases: Deardorff v. Alabama, CR-oi-o794, 2004 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 1t8, at *65 (Ala.
Crim. App. June 25, 2004) (rejecting petitioner's theory "that statutes that impose the death penalty in
the United States... create a substantial risk that an innocent person will be executed" and thus
violate due process); People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 842 (Il1. 1998) ("Defendant's complaint is simply
that the American criminal trial.., is not perfect. However.... defendant does not suggest a
substitute for this system as the means of determining guilt or innocence.... Have mistakes been
made? Will mistakes be made? Certainly.").
See also Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, by Risking Execution of the Innocent, Violate
Substantive Due Process?, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1359 (2004); Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies
Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REv.
1777 (2003); Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due Process
Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29 (2003).
194. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Commentary, Abolition in Our Time, I OIo ST. J.
CRM. L. 323 (2003). For similar penetrating reflections on the prospects of constitutional change, see
Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the
Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475 (2002); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, io9 HARV.
L. REV. 355 (I995).
195. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 261 n.4.
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protections to criminal defendants in situations when they perceived
themselves to be at risk of becoming criminal defendants.' 6 And, despite
their occasional peccadilloes, most legislators clearly do not consider
themselves likely candidates for the death penalty.
More broadly, the notion that mistakes-even fatal ones-are
simply the natural cost of any fallible human activity continues to be an
underlying assumption of many prominent proponents of capital
punishment.7 Often, such views are coupled with the utilitarian claim
that capital punishment also prevents the killing of some innocent
victims-either by convincing criminals engaged in violent acts to stop
short of killing their victims, or by permanently incapacitating those who
might have managed to escape from prison if they had been sentenced to
life terms. These potentially averted killings, in the minds of such
commentators, outweigh the possibility that innocent persons on death
row might be wrongfully executed.' Others have questioned whether
the problem of wrongful execution is simply worth all the hand-wringing
that it has generated-presumably on the basis that twenty-three
wrongful executions out of the roughly seven thousand state-sanctioned
killings conducted since i900 still represents a 99.67% "success" rate.'"
And persons from other philosophic perspectives may contend that the
state is morally entitled to take life even if it occasionally errs, because
such potential wrongs, although initiated by the state, are not intended
by it.
20 °
196. See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class". Why Congress (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (arguing that legislators in both the English
Parliament and the American Congress have instituted significant protections in the realm of criminal
justice administration when they believed themselves to be at risk of criminal prosecution).
197. According to Markman and Cassell:
Given the fallibility of human judgments, the possibility exists that the use of capital
punishment may result in the execution of an innocent person. This terrible prospect raises
the issue of whether the risk of error in administering the death penalty is sufficiently high
both to outweigh the potential benefits of capital punishment and to offend the moral
sensibilities that must support a free society's criminal justice system.
Supra note 146, at 121; accord, Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 628 (2005) ("Virtually all social policies and decisions quite literally
determine who will live and who will die.").
198. For consequentialist defenses of the death penalty based on deterring the deaths of innocent
victims of crime, see E. VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 226-29
(1983); Cassell, Defense, supra note i2; E. van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1986); John B. Wefing, Commentary, Wishful Thinking by Ronald J. Tabak: Why
DNA Testing Will Not Lead to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 33 CONN. L. REv. 861 (2001).
199. See Markman & Cassell, supra note 146, at 125 n.22.
2o0. For a suggestive treatment of the differences between intended consequences and unintended
side-effects, see John M. Finnis, Intention and Side-Effects, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
LAW AND MORALS 32 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds. i99i).
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CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
We can never bring ourselves to believe, that it is necessary to forfeit
the life of a man on bare suspicion, on presumptions without proof,
and on inferences unsupported by evidence."'
With roughly 3,500 persons currently on death row in America-
many of whom continue to proclaim their innocence-does it make any
sense to devote time to discussing the problem of persons who have been
wrongfully executed in the past? 2. Does a focus on the history of
wrongful execution detract from the hard work of representing innocent
persons on death row or of curtailing a host of other evils, including
improper police interrogations, Brady violations, and other matters? 3 Is
devoting scholarly attention to the phenomenon of "actual innocence"
itself "misguided," given that cases of actual innocence are likely to
"constitute a non-representative sampling of criminal defendants" and,
thus, may serve to "deflect[] attention from more banal miscarriages of
justice," such as the misconduct of police and prosecutors?2" And,
finally, to the extent that historical scholarship of the type presented in
this Article reveals that the framers of the United States Constitution
were likely to have been acutely aware of the problem of wrongful
execution based on over a century of English experience, does such legal-
historical research actually set back the cause of either reforming or
abolishing the death penalty?"
These questions are not to be taken lightly. Yet the attempt to
reconstruct the history of wrongful execution may also yield certain
practical benefits. Although efforts to exonerate those currently on death
row have achieved momentous results, such exonerations have also been
cited by proponents of the death penalty as proof that the system's
protections actually work °6 By contrast, no wrongful execution can be
201. PHILLIPPS, PRESUMPTIVE PROOF, supra note 56, at 43.
202. See Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.
php?scid=9&did=188#year (tallying 3,471 persons on death row as of October 2004). For a discussion
of the mismatch between resources and needs in the area of criminal defense, see Daryl K. Brown,
Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
8oi (2004).
203. Some have even questioned whether persons troubled by the administration of the death
penalty should argue for reforming the system rather than outright abolition. See Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIo
ST. L.J. 417 (2002).
204. Medwed, supra note I, at iio6 n.3i.
205. See supra note Igo and accompanying text.
206. As the court observed in United States v. Denis, "the fact that five of... thirty one people
have had their death sentences reversed [under the FDPA] only further evinces the point that the
federal system has the adequate procedural safeguards in place to prevent innocent people from being
put to death." 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Cassell, Executing the Innocent,
supra note 150 (suggesting that the sixty-eight percent rate of legal error detected by Liebman in 2000
"might ... be viewed as a reassuring sign of the judiciary's circumspection before imposing the
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salvaged on such terms. In a related vein, exonerations of persons before
they are actually executed-while of life-saving importance to the
exonerated-may be viewed by some as having "no bearing on the
wisdom of executing persons properly convicted of capital crimes."2" To
such persons, only an example of an innocent person who had actually
been executed would presumably have any chance of giving reason for
pause.
But how might cases such as those of the Perrys, "the Warwickshire
uncle," or other notorious seventeenth- and eighteenth-century instances
of wrongful execution possibly matter in a modern-day American
political climate in which advocates of the death penalty question the
relevance even of cases decided before the due process "revolution" of
the I97os?"°s
First, legal history may help make modern-day proposals designed to
reduce the risk of wrongful conviction and wrongful execution seem less
revolutionary than their opponents might claim and, thus, render them
more likely to be accepted. In recent years, scholars and state
commissions have devoted considerable energy to determining the
sources of error in capital cases and to suggesting ways that those errors
might be reduced."° Suggestions have included raising the standard of
proof in capital cases," ' taping pre-trial interrogations to safeguard the
voluntariness of confessions,' and mandating judicial assessment and
instruction concerning the reliability of the testimony of jailhouse
informants."' The responses of eighteenth-century English
ultimate sanction"). For a less optimistic approach, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Do Exonerations Prove
That "The System Works"?, 86 JUDICATURE 83 (2002).
207. Markman & Cassell, supra note 146, at 125 (emphasis added). "After reviewing 23 years of
capital sentences, the study's authors (like other researchers) were unable to find a single case in
which an innocent person was executed. Thus, the most important error rate-the rate of mistaken
executions- is zero." Cassell, Executing the Innocent, supra note 150.
208. Cf Markman & Cassell, supra note 146, at 122 (questioning the relevance to contemporary
debates of alleged cases of wrongful execution claimed to have occurred "long before the adoption of
the extensive contemporary system of safeguards in the death penalty's administration").
209. See, e.g., Illinois Commission Report, supra note 8; James S. Liebman et al., A Broken
System, Part II: Why There is So Much Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It
(2002), available at http://ccjr.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vti?id=2664i; Peter Neufeld,
Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 29
HOFsTRA L. REV. 1155 (2OOI).
210, See, e.g., Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a
Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May be Death?, 78 CHi-KENT L. REV. 1359,
1361 (2003) (proposing that "[if] a jury finds a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it may not
proceed to the penalty phase unless it also certifies that it has found the defendant guilty beyond all
possible doubt").
211. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping
of Interrogations is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 337
(2001).
212. See Illinois Commission Report, supra note 8, Recommendation No. 57 (recommending a
"special caution with respect to the reliability of the testimony of in-custody informants"). See
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commentators and judges to the risks of wrongful execution (which
included the corpus delicti rule, the confession rule, and the
corroboration rule) reveal that the types of reforms recently proposed
are not revolutionary but, instead, are akin to the types of rules that
English legal commentators and judges in previous centuries considered
it necessary to adopt. Indeed, they did so even in the quick, crude, and
error-plagued trials of the eighteenth century and in a setting where the
commitment to due process was far less concrete than in today's climate
of constitutionalized criminal procedure.
Second, legal history, by demonstrating the contingency of the past
and the range of responses undertaken by legal actors, may help us to
identify fresh approaches to the problems in criminal justice
administration that confront us. By the late eighteenth century, as we
have seen, English judges-including those practicing at the time of the
Constitution's framing -routinely excluded the uncorroborated
testimony of accomplices." 3 By way of example, practice under the
FDPA is markedly different. As Judge Rakoff noted in Quinones,
"federal practice, in contrast to that of many states that allow the death
penalty, permits conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice....4 Recognizing the profound differences between the
present and past can serve not only as a useful diagnostic tool, but as a
path to reform.
Third, a legal history of wrongful execution may help us to identify
commonalities over time with respect to the causes of legal error.
Although the English cases of wrongful execution reconstructed in this
Article may appear picaresque to the modern eye, they demonstrate
certain important commonalities with the sources of error in modern-day
capital cases: confession evidence that is fallible, witnesses who are
willing to lie, and prosecutors who are eager to rush to judgment.
Lastly, continuities between the past and present in the nature of the
responses to the phenomenon of wrongful execution may place us in a
better position to assess and critique the motivations and arguments of
modern-day participants in the debate over capital punishment.
Although certain prominent skeptics have continued to deny the
existence of wrongful execution in the age of America's so-called "due
process revolution," those denials may become less convincing once we
realize that commentators in early nineteenth-century America also
sought to deny the relevance of wrongful execution to the American
condition. Indeed, those nineteenth-century commentators did so when
generally Aaron M. Clemens, Note & Casenote, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to
Prevent Unjust Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151 (2004).
213. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
214. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases).
[V01, 56: 1185
June 2005] HISTORY OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION 1233
the evidence of wrongful execution-in the form of "victims" who had
returned to the scene-was patently clear for all to see. If accepting the
existence of a problem is commonly viewed as a necessary prerequisite to
change, acknowledging and understanding the history of wrongful
execution may itself prove to be a valuable step towards reform.
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